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Transparency and Disclosure 
Diane Ring 
1. Introduction 
1.1 BEPS and Tax Information. 
Across the globe, countries increasingly express the concern that they are facing serious financial 
challenges from base erosion and profit shifting. Without a stable and adequate tax base, 
countries lose the financial capacity to provide infrastructure, social services and development 
opportunities important to their citizens. In response, the G20 and OECD organized the BEPS 
Project. Much of the project is focused on substantive law—the rules and practices that can allow 
a country’s tax base to be eroded and profits shifted out of the country. But the project 
recognizes that substantive tax rules alone are not sufficient to guarantee a country’s tax base. 
Without adequate transparency and disclosure of tax information to the taxing authorities, even 
the most carefully designed substantive tax rules will fail to protect the base. Thus, an important 
part of the BEPS work targets the more administrative issues of transparency and disclosure. 
Ultimately, the goal is to ensure that tax authorities have adequate and appropriate access to 
information necessary for the effective administration of the tax law. As part of this mission, the 
BEPS project includes the development of standards for information reporting by multinational 
enterprises—“country-by-country reporting.” (See 3.3.2). 
1.2 Broader Context for Tax Information Issues. 
The BEPS work on transparency and disclosure is not occurring in a vacuum. Existing tools offer 
tax administrators different avenues for accessing information. Such tools include: bilateral tax 
treaties (based on the UN and/or OECD Model Treaties), TIEAs (tax exchange information 
agreements often based on the OECD Model), regional agreements, and the work of the Global 
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information. (See 5.2, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6) Additionally, there 
are new developments taking place outside the formal BEPS project, some initiated by individual 
countries, others the work of regional networks or other international bodies, including: IGAs 
(intergovernmental agreements) (4.5), automatic exchange of information agreements, the 
common reporting standards (CRS) for automatic exchange (4.3), and increased attention to the 
Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (5.4). 
1.3 Scope of the Paper.  
The purpose of this paper is to provide developing countries with an overview of both the new 
developments in transparency and disclosure as well as existing options for obtaining 
information. Some of the new developments remain in progress and final recommendations have 
not yet been made. But the examination provided below of the key goals, concerns, advantages 
and disadvantages of various options (including existing methods and newly proposed ones) 
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should help countries evaluate their own circumstances and determine which options make the 
most sense for them in their effort to curb base erosion and profit shifting. Given the newness of 
certain proposals (e.g., actions taken under the BEPS project, including country-by-country 
reporting), this paper will devote more attention to reviewing the anticipated content and 
implementation of these options with which countries may be less familiar. 
1.4 Pervasive Questions in Transparency and Disclosure.  
Regardless of the specific mechanism for providing information to tax administrators, a number 
of universals questions arise: (1) what type of information must be provided, (2) how difficult 
will it be for the taxpayer to provide that information, (3) how will the information be provided, 
(4) what kind of technology and infrastructure will be needed by the taxpayers and the country to 
implement this system, (5) to whom will the information be distributed, (6) what are the 
permissible uses of the information, (7) does the country have the capacity to meaningfully use 
the information, and (8) how will data protection and taxpayer privacy be ensured? The success, 
failure, and impact of a given regime for providing tax information will depend significantly on 
the responses to these identified concerns. That said, there is no single appropriate response to 
these questions. By examining each of the new emerging information regimes, as well as the 
existing ones, against the backdrop of these questions, a country can determine its own most 
effective path toward appropriately protecting its tax base. 
2. Transparency and Disclosure in the Current Tax World 
2.1 Overview. 
Recent efforts to ensure that countries have access to information needed to meaningfully and 
effectively implement their tax laws have focused on the goals of “transparency” and 
“disclosure.” These terms appear in the BEPS Action Plan (July 2013) and a variety of related 
documents and commentaries.  These two terms are distinct from the related phrase “exchange of 
information;” thus, it can be useful to specify their meaning. All three play a critical role in 
guaranteeing that countries have the needed information. 
 
2.1.1 Transparency: This term reflects that idea that a country needs to understand how a 
taxpayer is conducting its business, is structuring its operations, and is making 
investments in the country. To achieve this level of understanding, it may be necessary 
for the country to have a solid grasp of the taxpayer’s activities, transactions and 
business structure beyond the borders of that jurisdiction. 
 
2.1.2 Disclosure: This term captures the idea that a country will need access to the 
information necessary to provide transparency regarding the taxpayer’s activities. 
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2.1.3 Exchange of Information: This phrase refers to the process (and mechanism) by which 
a country can obtain information regarding a taxpayer or the taxpayer’s transactions, 
typically from another country. The most well-known mechanisms for exchange of 
information are bilateral tax treaty provisions based on Article 26 of the UN and the 
OECD Model Income Tax Treaties, discussed in 5.2. 2.2 Current Need for Information. 
As noted above, and discussed more extensively in 5.1, the demand for taxpayer information by 
taxing authorities is not new.  However, the current lack of transparency that many countries face 
(due in part to insufficient disclosure), has become a significant problem. The growth in cross 
border commerce by MNEs, both foreign and domestic, has created a crisis in information for 
several reasons:  
 
2.2.1 Cross Border Tax Planning. Taxpayers with cross border activities can engage in a 
wider array of tax planning techniques which can lead to base erosion and profit 
shifting. Substantive tax law changes that are designed to eliminate various arbitrage 
opportunities are one tool for attacking this problem. But substantive tax reform is 
insufficient given that arbitrage may be difficult to identify and fully eradicate. 
Adequate disclosure remains vital for the needed transparency regarding taxpayer 
activities. 
 
2.2.2 Volume of Cross Border Business. Both the number of taxpayers engaging in cross 
border business and the volume of business they conduct have been increasing.  Thus, 
the scale of the base erosion and profit shifting at stake is significant. Correspondingly, 
the amount of information that countries’ must access, process, and evaluate to stem the 
loss of tax base is also quite large. Mechanisms for providing information to countries 
must be tailored to promote the goal of transparency and understanding. 
 
2.2.3 Role of Developing Countries in the Global Economy. Developing countries have 
experienced significant growth in inbound investment by foreign multinationals as well 
as outbound activities of their own multinationals. Income generated by these MNEs 
forms a critical portion of the tax base, and as noted in 2.2.1, is especially susceptible to 
base erosion and profit shifting tax planning.  
 
For all countries facing such base erosion and profit shifting from multinationals, the 
ability to access and use tax information is vital. But developing countries may find that 
they encounter serious barriers to securing needed information, as compared to other 
jurisdictions. Not only do developing countries often experience a number of domestic 
constraints on their ability to access and use taxpayer information (see 2.2.4.2), they 
may also find it more difficult to obtain information from other jurisdictions (see 
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2.2.4.3). Additionally, to the extent that foreign multinationals pose a greater 
information transparency and disclosure risk than domestic ones, developing countries 
face a distinct challenge. They typically have a substantial amount of inbound 
investment relative to outbound and therefore have more foreign multinationals 
taxpayers than domestic ones. 
 
2.2.4 Informational Challenges for Developing Countries. As noted in 2.2.3, developing 
countries are especially dependent on corporate taxation of MNEs for their tax base.  To the 
extent MNEs are able to engage in successful base eroding and profit shifting transactions, 
developing countries typically have fewer alternative tax bases upon which to draw (e.g., 
individual taxes, consumptions taxes).1 Thus, BEPS problems can be particularly significant to 
these jurisdictions. The costs of BEPS to developing countries may be more severe and the 
impediments to overcoming BEPS may also be greater for these jurisdictions. Developing 
countries may experience a number of hurdles to securing information, transparency and 
disclosure from multinational businesses. A review of these barriers directs attention to the 
changes that may be needed and allows reform proposals to be measured against this list of 
challenges to see where and how much they can help. The impediments can roughly be grouped 
into three categories: (1) domestic law, (2) domestic enforcement, and (3) international support. 
 
2.2.4.1 Domestic Law Impediments. Some countries already have in place domestic law 
reporting requirements that provide relevant taxpayer information. Such reporting requirements 
can include the taxpayer’s obligation to provide information regarding: (1) foreign related 
entities and related party transactions, (2) foreign financial assets and accounts, (3) discrepancies 
between tax reporting and accounting treatment; and (4) certain kinds of tax shelters or otherwise 
suspect transactions and structures. This information can be useful in helping a country 
determine whether to initiate an audit, and where and how to direct their attention in an audit. To 
the extent that developing countries typically do not have such reporting regimes in place, 
changes to domestic law reporting requirements may be one step in the process of enhancing 
transparency and disclosure. The final recommendations that ultimately emerge from the BEPS 
Project regarding Action Items 12 and 13 may play a guiding role for countries that are just 
starting to institute such reporting requirements. (See 3.3, 3.4). 
 
The work of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information identifies other 
fundamental domestic law features that can inhibit (or conversely facilitate) transparency. The 
Global Forum’s Peer Review process is intended to provide a mechanism for assessing a 
country’s compliance with “the international standard of transparency and exchange of 
information.”2  (See 5.5). In evaluating a jurisdiction along these measures, the Global Forum 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., OECD, Part I of a Report to G20 Development Working Group on the Impact of BEPS on Low Income 
Countries (July 2014) at 11. 
2 Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Tax Transparency 2014: Report 
on Progress (November 2013) at 17. 
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reviews a number of key dimensions of the domestic law critical to transparency. One set of 
factors looks to the availability of information on the following topics: (1) ownership and 
identity information for entities and structures; (2) accounting records; and (3) banking 
information for account holders. Another set of factors looks at the rules and procedures 
governing access to that information. The expectation is that the designated tax authorities in the 
country (the competent authority) have the power under domestic law to obtain that information 
and provide it in under an exchange of information mechanism, while respecting taxpayer 
rights.3 Although the focus of the Peer Review process and recommendations may be directed 
toward enhancing exchange of information with other countries, many of the same rules, 
practices and procedures that enable a country to participate actively in information exchange 
would improve the country’s ability to implement its own tax system and limit base erosion and 
profit shifting. The same availability of and access to information that enables a jurisdiction to be 
a global partner in sharing information with other countries would facilitate its tax enforcement 
and revenue collection. Thus, engagement with the Global Forum work may be useful for 
developing countries, regardless of the amount of taxpayer information sought from their 
jurisdiction. See 5.4. 
 
2.2.4.2  Domestic Enforcement Impediments. All countries face the question of whether 
their administrative system is effective in using the information available. However, developing 
countries may face barriers to deriving maximum benefit from the information that they do 
currently possess (or that they may be able to acquire in the immediate future).4 These barriers 
can include: (1) limited audit staff; (2) audit staff without the required training and experience 
(e.g., an ability to review foreign language documents, a detailed understanding of transfer 
pricing and tax law); (3) regular attrition of highly trained staff; (4) technological limitations 
regarding the ability to receive, manage, store and work with different types of data; (5) 
inadequate system for identifying and matching taxpayers; and (6) an existing culture of limited 
tax compliance. 
 
Any recommendations about how to increase access to information and improve transparency 
and disclosure (e.g., recommendations pursuant to BEPS Action Items 11, 12, and 13) should be 
evaluated against the backdrop of these domestic enforcement impediments. For example, 
transparency and disclosure recommendations that could ease any of the current impediments 
might be particularly attractive to developing countries, even if other options would be more 
effective for developed economies. To the extent a particular recommendation would yield more 
limited benefits for a developing country due to domestic enforcement constraints, adoption of 
that recommendation might be paired with a concrete support plan designed to build the tax 
                                                          
3 Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, The Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes: Information Brief (November 2013) at 6-7. 
4 See generally, OECD, Part I of a Report to G20 Development Working Group on the Impact of BEPS on Low 
Income Countries (July 2014). 
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administration’s capacity to effectively use the information to curb base erosion and profit 
shifting in their jurisdiction.5 
 
2.2.4.3 International Impediments. A country’s success in tackling BEPS will depend in 
part on its ability to actively engage with the international community and obtain information 
from other jurisdictions. The most obvious examples of such engagement arise under Article 26 
Exchange of Information provisions in bilateral tax treaties (based on the U.N. and the OECD 
Models) and under Tax Information Exchange Agreements (“TEIAs” such as those based on the 
OECD Model). See 5.2 and 5.3. Therefore, the more limited a country’s network of bilateral 
treaties and TIEAs, the more constrained the country may be in gathering needed information. 
Relatedly, bilateral tax treaties and TIEAs whose terms impose significant barriers to exchange 
(such as the level of information that the requester must provide, or the nature of the tax 
violation in the requesting state) effectively reduce the value of these agreements as meaningful 
tools for developing countries. 
 
International mechanisms for sharing information across borders are important in their own right 
as independent and currently existing tools for responding to BEPS problems. But the 
availability of these mechanisms may also be important in the future as the BEPS Project moves 
toward recommendations and action. Depending on how various Action Items related to 
transparency, disclosure and information are designed, a country’s ability to benefit fully from 
the BEPS recommendations could depend on the country’s treaty network. For example, if the 
information gains anticipated from Action Item 13 (e.g., a country-by-country reporting 
template) require a country to obtain that information from the MNE parent’s home jurisdiction, 
the question of “mechanism” would arise. If the envisioned mechanism is an existing treaty 
exchange of information provision, then developing jurisdictions, particularly those with more 
limited treaty networks (tax treaties and TIEAs) would find it harder to obtain the information 
and proceed with their efforts to stops base erosion and profit shifting. This issue is widely 
acknowledged, and is discussed more extensively in 3.3. 2.3 Response to Increased Need for Information. 
The global tax community’s focus on base erosion and profit shifting has included recognition of 
the centrality of information to tax administration. As discussed in 3.1, the G20 and the OECD 
both supported the BEPS action plan, including its attention to transparency, disclosure and 
information. The plan operates against the backdrop of existing mechanisms for the provision of 
information (see 4.1, 5.1). The value added by the BEPS plan derives from its focus on the 
information-driven crisis points in base erosion and profit shifting. It targets the gaps created by 
the current system of providing information to tax authorities that leave countries susceptible to 
                                                          
5 See, e.g., C20 Position Paper Background: Governance (7 August 2014) at 6 (encouraging research regarding the 
cost/benefit tradeoff for automatic exchange of information and the impact on developing countries), available at 
http://www.c20.org.au/resources/. 
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base erosion and profit shifting through related party transactions, transfer pricing and cross 
border arbitrage.  
 
However, the BEPS setting is not the only context in which global tax actors continue to 
examine how tax administration can be strengthened through transparency and disclosure. In 
some cases, individual countries have taken action that has triggered a more global response. For 
example, the United States’ implementation of the FATCA (Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act) regime which requires foreign financial entities to disclose information regarding U.S. 
taxpayers to the U.S. tax authorities or face penalties, has led to the signing of IGAs 
(intergovernmental agreements), (see 4.5). Additionally, other countries increasingly seek to 
secure similar commitments for taxpayer information from foreign financial entities. In still other 
cases, international bodies are promoting enhanced access to information through automatic 
information exchange (see 4.2), and/or through the expansion of the Multilateral Agreement on 
Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters (see 5.3). 
 
Thus, while the need to acquire information is as old as the international tax system, the current 
climate for tax administration differs from the past. The scale of information needed, its 
complexity, and its importance have all grown dramatically. Although traditional information-
based tools for facilitating tax compliance remain relevant and valuable, close examination of the 
ways in which transparency and disclosure can be enhanced is a critical topic for countries to 
tackle now. To that end, section 3 of this paper reviews and analyzes the BEPS Project’s work on 
transparency and disclosure. Section 4 then undertakes a similar examination of new 
developments in information gathering occurring outside of the BEPS Project. Finally, section 5 
provides context for the new reforms and recommendations by revisiting more familiar tools and 
techniques currently available for enhancing transparency and disclosure.   
 
As the review of each new and old information-related provision and practice reveals, there are 
no simple solutions to the complexity of today’s information rich (and information dependent) 
environment. There may be substantial agreement on the importance of transparency and 
disclosure as broad concepts, but the effort to translate those principals into specific practices 
and regimes unmasks the challenges and concerns outlined in 1.4. Countries’ assessment of the 
right balance and mix among these risks, trade-offs and benefits may vary depending on their 
domestic infrastructure, their economic position, their existing network of tax agreements and 
tools, and their substantive tax system. 2.4 Summary of the Current Tax Environment and Its Connection to 
Transparency and Disclosure: 
Multinationals with significant cross-border business activities form an important part of today’s 
economy for all countries. The growth in cross-border commerce has increased the opportunity 
for tax planning and correspondingly increased countries’ need for taxpayer information. 
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Developing countries may confront a number of challenges as their tax administrators seek the 
information necessary for effective enforcement of the tax laws. The challenges include: (1) 
domestic law impediments (inadequate required reporting by multinationals regarding assets, 
accounts, and transactions); (2) constrained domestic enforcement (due to limited audit staff, 
inexperienced staff, attrition of trained staff, insufficient technological capacity to receive, 
manage and store data, and to link taxpayers to data); and (3) international impediments (limited 
treaty network and high treaty thresholds for requesting information). The BEPS project 
recognizes the centrality of tax information to meaningful tax administration and the Action 
Items discussed below explicitly seek to increase both the quality and the availability of relevant 
information. But in addition to the BEPS project, transparency and disclosure is the subject of 
other international efforts to curtail base erosion and profit shifting, including the rise of IGAs, 
the support for automatic exchange of information, and expanded treaty networks. 
3.  BEPS and Transparency and Disclosure 
3.1 Overview of BEPS Action Items Related to Tax Information, 
Transparency and Disclosure.  
The BEPS Action Plan released in July 2013 included two significant action items related to the 
increased provision of information to countries by taxpayers:6 (1) Action Item 12: Requiring 
taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax planning arrangements; and (2) Action Item 13: Re-
examining transfer pricing documentation (including establishment of a common reporting 
template, referred to as “country-by-country reporting”).  
 
Currently, the most serious attention is being directed at Action Item 13 (transfer pricing and 
related issues), which includes the proposal for country-by-country reporting. This proposal, 
which has been ranked as of “high” relevance to developing countries,7 is discussed extensively 
in 3.3. The companion information-reporting provision, Action Item 12 (aggressive tax 
planning), has a target deliverable date of September 2015 on the BEPS Action Plan timetable, 
and should likely be the subject of increased public discussion over the coming year. Action Item 
12, reported as being of “medium” relevance to developing countries,8 is more briefly considered 
below in 3.4. 
 
                                                          
6 Other Action Items may, in a more limited manner, enhance transparency and disclosure through mechanisms not 
based on taxpayer provision of information. For example, Action Item 5 (“Countering harmful tax practices more 
effectively, taking into account transparency and substance”) focuses in part on “including compulsory spontaneous 
exchange on rulings related to preferential regimes.” 
7 OECD, Part 1 of A Report to G20 Development Working Group on the Impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries, 
(July 2014) at 31 (Annex A).  
8 OECD, Part 1 of A Report to G20 Development Working Group on the Impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries, 
(July 2014) at 30 (Annex A).  
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One additional Action Plan topic, Action Item 11, seeks to improve countries’ (and the global tax 
community’s) understanding of the “scale and economic impact” of BEPS by establishing 
“methodologies to collect and analyse data on BEPS and the actions to address it.” This Item, 
which has been listed as of “high” relevance for developing countries,9 has a target delivery date 
of September 2015, and is considered below in 3.2.  
3.2 Action Item 11: Collect and Analyze BEPS Data. 
Although Action Items 12 and 13 share the common mission with Item 11 of helping countries 
more effectively address BEPS problems through improved knowledge and understanding, their 
focus and “solution” are different. Action Items 12 and 13 target specific taxpayer conduct 
through enhanced reporting requirements for actual taxpayers.  Both Actions Items 12 and 13 
anticipate changing the kinds of information that taxpayers must provide to countries. The new 
information presumably would enable a country to more effectively and accurately evaluate a 
multinational taxpayer and identify conduct that is creating base erosion and profit shifting 
(either by aggressive planning, or by cross border related party transactions and structures). In 
that way, Action Items 12 and 13 function more as a support to and enhancement of the audit 
function.  
 
3.2.1 Goals of Action Item 11. In contrast to Items 12 and 13, Action Item 11 targets a more 
systemic goal – obtaining a comprehensive, overall picture of the BEPS problem. Action Item 11 
is expected to “[d]evelop recommendations regarding indicators of the scale and economic 
impact of BEPS and ensure that tools are available to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness and 
economic impact of the actions taken to address BEPS on an ongoing basis.” For example, 
Action Item 11 would seek to calculate the effects on overall tax receipts, total employment, 
geographic location of employment, investment in physical capital, investments in knowledge-
based capital, tax competition, etc.10 Once data and methodologies are in place to “measure” the 
problem, Action Item 11 anticipates developing indicators and tools to monitor the success of 
BEPS actions taken by countries.11 
 
The focus is not only on what is happening within a given country due to BEPS, but also the 
“spillover” effects on other jurisdictions as well. This newly collected information is expected to 
help policymakers and countries evaluate all of the changes implemented pursuant to the BEPS 
plan. Thus, Action Item 11 will provide key diagnostic tools for determining whether the 
implementations of steps under other BEPS Action Items are meeting their goals.  
                                                          
9 OECD, Part 1 of A Report to G20 Development Working Group on the Impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries, 
(July 2014) at 30 (Annex A).  
10 OECD, Request for Input, BEPS Action 11: Establish methodologies to collect and analyse data on BEPS and the 
actions to address it, (4 August 2014) at 3. 
11 OECD, Request for Input, BEPS Action 11: Establish methodologies to collect and analyse data on BEPS and the 
actions to address it, (4 August 2014) at 3. 
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3.2.2 Data Collection under Action Item 11 and Its Impact: Some of the data will be collected 
on an aggregate basis (such as “FDI and balance of payments data”), but the BEPS Action plan 
also anticipates that taxpayer level data (financial statements, tax returns) will play an important 
role. We can anticipate that the taxpayer-level data portion of Action Item 11 will raise many of 
the same questions and concerns as Items 12 and 13. Thus, the examination of these questions in 
3.3 in the context of country-by-country reporting should be relevant and helpful to the Action 
Item 11 discussion that is anticipated. Future data collection and reporting under Action Item 11, 
though potentially influential in the longer term, will have less immediate relevance for 
developing countries seeking to protect their tax bases. 
3.3 Action Item 13: Transfer Pricing Related Documentation. 
3.3.1 Overview.  Action Item 13 responds to the determination that transfer pricing is a crucial 
facet of BEPS and that tax administrators face a serious problem in responding to these BEPS 
issues because of information asymmetry between tax authorities and taxpayers. Tax authorities 
need the ability to evaluate an MNE’s global value chain and obtain detailed data on the  
structure of its activities, operations, and intra-group transactions. Taxpayers, too, may find 
current transfer pricing regimes unsatisfactory to the extent that varying transfer pricing 
documentation standards and practices across countries place an unnecessary and unproductive 
burden on reporting taxpayers.12 
 
Action Item 13 calls for a re-examination of transfer pricing documentation, with attention to 
two potentially competing goals: enhancement of transparency for tax administration and 
sensitivity to taxpayer compliance costs. But perhaps more importantly, Action Item 13 seeks the 
establishment of rules that would require an MNE to “provide all relevant governments with 
needed information on their global allocation of the income, economic activity and taxes paid 
among countries according to a common template.”13 This reporting template concept is known 
as “country-by-country reporting.” 
 
The prospect of a new reporting format with new information raised a number of questions that 
have dominated the discussion of country-by-country reporting.  Briefly, the issues can be 
broadly identified as (1) the kind of information required, (2) the burden on taxpayers, (3) 
permitted recipients of the information and permitted uses of the information, (4) countries’ 
ability to use the information, (5) protection of taxpayer data, and (6) delivery mechanism.14 
 
3.3.2 OECD Introduction of Action Item 13. In January 2014 the OECD released a Discussion 
Draft on transfer pricing documentation and country-by-country (“CbC”) reporting (Action Item 
                                                          
12 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (July 2013) at 22-23. 
13 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (July 2013) at 23. 
14 See, e.g., OECD, Memorandum on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country by Country Reporting  (3 
October 2013). 
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13).15 The Discussion draft identified the three core goals for transfer pricing documentation: (1) 
risk assessment: “provide tax administrations with the information necessary to conduct an 
informed transfer pricing risk assessment;” (2) appropriate taxpayer pricing practices: “ensure 
that taxpayers direct sufficient attention to transfer pricing requirements in establishing prices 
and other conditions for transactions between associated enterprises and in reporting the income 
derived from such transactions in their tax returns;” and (3) audit support: “provide tax 
administrations with the information that they require in order to conduct an appropriately 
thorough audit of the transfer pricing practices of entities subject to tax in their jurisdiction.”16 
 
With respect to these goals, the Discussion Draft sought input regarding (1) whether the BEPS 
work on this Action Item should include additional forms and questionnaires (beyond the CBC 
template) and (2) the appropriate rules for the production of information and documents held by 
related parties outside the jurisdiction of the taxing authority undertaking the audit inquiry. The 
expected content of the country-by-country reporting template is discussed in more detailed 
below in 3.3.3.2. 
 
3.3.3 Discussion Draft Plan for Transfer Pricing and Country-by-Country Reporting. The 
Discussion Draft envisioned a standardized reporting system for taxpayers, which has since been 
formalized to have three components: (1) the Master file, (2) the Country-by-Country template, 
and (3) the Local File. 
 
3.3.3.1 Master File. This master file would contain “standardized information for all MNE 
group members.” The goal of this information would be to provide a “reasonably complete 
picture of the global business, financial reporting, debt structure, tax situation and the allocation 
of the MNE’s income.”17 The information to be provided would cover five categories: (1) group 
organizational structure, (2) description of business or businesses, (3) the intangibles held by the 
group, (4) intercompany financial activities, and (5) the MNE’s financial and tax positions.  
 
The relative brevity of the description of the master file belies the number of complicated 
choices and options imbedded in its design. The Discussion Draft flagged many of them. The 
preliminary decision is whether to have MNEs prepare the file for the group as a whole or by line 
of business, depending which would be most useful for tax administrators. Reporting by business 
line raised two observations—the potential for flexibility in sharing different business line 
information with different countries and also the concern that countries would be unable to 
ascertain that the MNE had fully reported all income and activities. It has been emphasized that 
                                                          
15 OECD, Public Consultation: Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation and CbC Reporting (30 
January 2014). 
16 OECD, Public Consultation: Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation and CbC Reporting (30 
January 2014) at 2. 
17 OECD, Public Consultation: Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation and CbC Reporting (30 
January 2014). 
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the master file information is intended to provide a high level risk overview and should be used 
consistent with that function (and, for example, not replace actual audits and more detailed 
taxpayer specific analysis and inquiry). 
 
3.3.3.2 CbC Template.  The CbC template is expected to require taxpayer reporting on the 
following seven items: (1) revenue, (2) earnings before taxes, (3) cash tax, (4) current year tax 
accruals, (5) stated capital and accumulated earnings, (6) number of employees, and (7) tangible 
assets.18 This information would be provided on a country-by-country basis (as opposed to 
entity-by-entity). 
 
The template would be accompanied by a list of all group entities and permanent establishments, 
by country, along with business activity codes identifying their major activities. Taxpayers will 
have the flexibility to use either statutory account data or financial statement reporting packages 
to complete the template, if data usage is applied consistently across the group and across years. 
Information contained in the country-by-country template would provide tax authorities with a 
clearer picture of the relationship between reported profits, taxes paid, and the underlying details 
of economic activity (e.g., tangible assets, employees, employee expense) . 
 
Several questions pertaining specifically to the CBC template have been raised: 
 
(a) Accounting approach: Whether the template should use: 
i. Bottom-up reporting: using local statutory accounts to build the file (the 
current recommendation), or  
ii. Require/permit top-down allocation of the group’s consolidated income 
among the countries? 
iii. And, how the choice between the two may impact the calculation of 
compliance costs or the determination that additional requirements would be 
needed? 
• To provide further clarity regarding the impact of these choices and decisions, the 
Draft reported that Working Party (WP) 6 currently believes that if top-down 
reporting were adopted, it should reflect the earnings and revenue from cross-border 
related party transactions but should eliminate revenue and transactions as between 
related parties in the same country. 
(b) Burden and regulation: Is a requirement of consolidated reporting within each country 
unduly burdensome on taxpayers? Under the top-down model of allocating the MNE’s 
                                                          
18 The reporting items were reduced to seven from an original suggested 17 in the January 2014 Discussion Draft, 
following extensive taxpayer comments. See, e.g., Bell, “Country-by-Country Template Won’t Require Entity-by-
Entity Financial Details, Andrus Says,” BNA TRANSFER PRICING REPORT (April 10, 2014) available 
athttp://www.bna.com/countrybycountry-template-wont-n17179889500/; see also OECD Update on BEPS Project – 
Webcast Powerpoint (April 2, 2014) available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/OECD-BEPS-Webcast-2April.pdf. 
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income across countries, would additional guidance on appropriate sourcing, 
characterizing income, and allocating deductions be required? 
(c) Taxes: Should withholding tax paid be reported? Would that be particularly burdensome 
for taxpayers? 
(d) Cross-border related party payments: Should there be aggregate reporting of related 
party cross-border payments? How detailed? Would it be a significant burden if taxpayers 
were required to report intra-group interest, royalties, and services fees? 
(e) Nature of business activities: Would any business sectors require special treatment? 
Would this reporting be a significant burden on taxpayers? Are there other types of 
information for assessing economic activity that would be useful? 
 
The template information offers countries the ability to assess the transfer pricing and base 
erosion risk they face with the multinational (and thus where and how to audit). But anticipating 
a serious concern of taxpayers, the Draft cautions against countries effectively by-passing 
detailed audit work and using the CBC data to assert transfer pricing adjustments. 
 
3.3.3.3 Local File: The third element in the Action Item 13 package of transfer pricing 
information is the “local file.” The expectation is that the local file would include more 
jurisdiction-specific information that would complement the master file in helping the country 
ensure that the taxpayer complied with the arm’s length principle and transfer pricing rules in its 
major transactions connected to that jurisdiction. Broadly, the local file would include more 
detailed information regarding relevant transactions between the MNE’s entity in the local 
jurisdiction and its related entities in other countries, such as financial details of the transactions, 
a comparability analysis for pricing, and “selection and application of the most appropriate 
transfer pricing method for the fiscal year in question.”19  
 
The Discussion Draft attached an Annex which delineated the anticipated local file information.  
The information is grouped into three categories: 
 
Local entity: The first is information regarding the local entity itself: its management structure, 
organization chart, identification of individuals to whom the local management must report (and 
the jurisdiction of their principal offices), and any recent participation by the local entity in a 
business restructuring.   
 
Financial accounts: The second category seeks financial information important to the application 
of transfer pricing analysis: the local entity’s annual financial accounts (audited if available); 
schedules showing how financial data that was used in the transfer pricing method is linked to 
                                                          
19 OECD, Public Consultation: Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation and CbC Reporting (30 
January 2014) at 6. 
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the annual financial statements; summary schedules of the financial data of the comparables and 
the source of that data. 
 
Controlled transactions: The third category is information regarding controlled transactions 
involving the local entity.  A more specific list of information is enumerated here, which goes to 
the core of how the taxpayer applied the transfer pricing rules: 
*description of the transactions (e.g., services, purchase of goods, loans, etc.) and the 
context in which that transaction took place (e.g., business activity, financial activity, cost 
contribution arrangement) 
*aggregate charges for each category of transactions 
*identity of the related parties involved and the nature of their relationships 
*functional analysis of the taxpayer and the related entities regarding each category of 
controlled transactions (functions performed, assets used, assets contributed, intangibles 
involved, risks born, and changes compared to prior years). 
*identification and description of controlled party transactions that might impact the 
transaction in question 
*specification of the most appropriate transfer pricing method by category, the reasoning 
for the selection, which entity is the tested party (where relevant) and why, and assumptions 
made in using the method 
*if use of multi-year analysis, an explanation of why 
*information regarding comparables, how selected, search strategy, application of 
method, and relevant financial indicators used in the analysis 
*any adjustments to comparables, to the tested party 
*conclusions regarding the arm’s length status of related party transactions based on 
application of the selected method. 
 
3.3. 4 Implementation Issues under BEPS Action Item 13.  
Documentation and burden: Taxpayers are expected to price at arm’s length based on 
contemporaneous information, prior to engaging in the transaction, with confirmation completed 
before filing the tax return. But the Discussion Draft urges countries to consider the burden on 
the taxpayers when making documents requests. For example, taxpayers that can reasonably 
demonstrate the absence of comparables (or their absence at an appropriate cost) should not be 
required to bear such a burden. At present, the Draft Discussion specifically does not recommend 
that transfer pricing documentation be certified by an outside auditor. 
 
Timing: Given the diversity in countries’ expectations regarding when documentation should be 
available (when return filed, by time of audit) and how long taxpayers should have to respond to 
requests, the suggested best practice is for taxpayers to have both the master file and the local file 
ready by the time the tax return for the relevant year is filed (unless the jurisdiction practices 
contemporaneous auditing, which would require the information prior to the filing of the return). 
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In countries for which final statutory financial statements and related country-by-country 
reporting data are not available until after the tax return is due, the best practice would allow for 
completion of the country-by-country template by one year after the last day of the MNE 
parent’s fiscal year. 
 
Materiality. Conscious of the need to balance the competing interests of countries (seeking 
access to transfer pricing information) and taxpayers (seeking a “reasonable” documentation 
burden), the Discussion Draft recommends documentation requirements with materiality 
thresholds based on the “size and nature of the local economy, the importance of the MNE group 
in that economy, and the size and nature of local operating entities, in addition to the overall size 
and nature of the MNE group.”20 For example, many jurisdictions offer simplified transfer 
pricing documentation rules for small and medium sized enterprises. Nonetheless, such smaller 
business would be expected to provide data and documentation regarding material cross-border 
related party transactions when requested and also to complete the country-by-country template. 
 
Document Retention: Again, balancing taxpayer burdens and a country’s need to access 
information, the Draft recommends tax administrators take into account the difficulty in locating 
documents from prior years, and should make such requests only when there is a “good reason” 
relating to a transaction under review. To assist in the balance of burden and need, taxpayers 
should be permitted to store the documentation in a manner they find appropriate (electronic, 
paper, etc.) so long as it can be produced in a useable form to the tax authorities. 
 
Documentation Updates. Both the master file and local file should be updated annually, although 
in many cases information (e.g., functional analysis or description of business) may not change. 
The Discussion Draft offers a recommendation – but specifically seeks comments on it – that 
where operating conditions are unchanged, the tax administration may permit taxpayers to 
update their database searches for comparables in the local file every three years. Financial data, 
however, for the comparables would be updated annually. 
 
Language. The expectation is that the master file would be prepared and submitted to 
jurisdictions in English. However, at a minimum, the local file should be prepared in the relevant 
local language. To the extent the tax authorities need translation of portions of the master file, 
they can make that request to taxpayers, providing adequate time to secure the translation. 
 
Penalties. The Draft cautions against the imposition of documentation-related penalties (civil or 
criminal) where taxpayers have made a reasonable, good faith effort, and/or do not have access 
to the information. But it is not a good defense to documentation-related penalties to contend that 
some other related party bears the group responsibility for documentation. The decision not to 
                                                          
20 OECD, Public Consultation: Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation and CbC Reporting (30 
January 2014) at 7. 
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impose these penalties would not forestall a jurisdiction from making the underlying transfer 
pricing adjustment in order to bring taxpayers into compliance with the arm’s length principle. 
Two strategic observations regarding documentation-related penalties may guide countries 
thinking about designing a penalty regime: 
 
(1) Differences among countries penalty regime may influence whether a taxpayer “favours” 
one jurisdiction over another in pricing. For example, if one jurisdiction imposes stronger 
penalties (compliance and/or underlying substantive pricing penalties) than another, the 
taxpayer may be more inclined to shift resources (and even transfer pricing profits) to the 
jurisdiction with the stronger penalty regime, so as to avoid the imposition of large 
penalties. 
 
(2) A documentation regime that includes benefits for compliant taxpayers may increase 
taxpayer’s actual compliance with the documentation rules, which is a good outcome for 
the country. For example, if taxpayers who meet documentation requirements receive 
some measure of penalty protection (substantive penalties) or a shift in burden on some 
or all issues, there is an added taxpayer incentive for up-front conformity with the 
documentation requirements. 
 
Confidentiality. As the prospect of increased disclosure of information becomes more likely, 
taxpayers have expressed greater concern regarding confidentiality. The Draft urges tax 
administrations to protect taxpayers from: public disclosure of trade secrets, scientific secrets, 
and other confidential information. The need for protection should lead countries to carefully 
consider their requests for such information and to provide assurances to the taxpayer regarding 
confidentiality. To the extent public court proceedings or judicial decisions will entail some 
measure of disclosure, confidentiality should be reserved to the extent possible and disclosure 
should be as limited as possible. 
 
Implementation:  
(1) Changes to domestic law: Tax law, including transfer pricing rules, are a function of 
domestic law. Thus, in order to achieve the benefits of increased uniformity under 
Action Item 13 (as well as wide-spread adoption of best practices advocated by the 
Discussion Draft), countries will need to make changes to their own domestic law. 
Thus, for example, countries would need to enact transfer pricing and documentation 
rules that required their locally based MNE affiliates to produce information required 
for the master file, local file and the country-by-country template (as detailed in the 
three Annexes attached to the Discussion Draft). Given the general importance of 
consistency, and the need for master file information to be consistent across 
jurisdictions, countries should review their own domestic rules. The goal would be 
domestic rules that require production of information for the master file that conforms 
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to the Discussion Draft Annex (detailing the information in both the master file and 
the country-by-country reporting template). 
 
(2) Reporting oversight: As part of the effort to ensure consistency, the Draft 
recommends that the master file and the country-by-country template be completed 
under the supervision of the MNE parent corporation and then be shared with each 
country in which the MNE has an affiliated taxpayer. Each jurisdiction could obtain 
the master file from the local entity in its jurisdiction. If that request is not met, the 
local jurisdiction could request the master file from the MNE parent’s jurisdiction 
pursuant to a treaty based exchange of information provision. 
 
(3) Delivery mechanism: The Draft recommends that the MNE parent make the master 
file and the CbC template available to the local affiliates who will then share it with 
their local taxing authorities. But the Draft notes other possibilities and requested 
comments. Other delivery mechanism options for the master file and CbC template 
include: (1) direct local filing of the information by the MNE local affiliate; (2) filing 
of the information with the MNE parent jurisdiction, which would then share it with 
the  local affiliates’ jurisdictions through a treaty information exchange mechanism; 
or (3) some combination thereof.  Given that access to this new reporting format and 
information is at the heart of BEPS Action Item 13, many countries have strongly 
advocated that the delivery mechanism should be uncomplicated and widely 
available. See 3.3.6.2.2.  Taxpayers, though, have repeated their concerns that the 
delivery mechanism should include appropriate safeguards ensuring the protection of 
their information. 
 
3.3.5 General Questions Regarding Proposed Action Item 13 Recommendations. 
 
3.3.5.1 Taxpayer Burden. On balance, the current Draft Recommendations regarding Action 
Item 13 (see 3.3.3) reflect the concerns raised by multinational taxpayers and their advisers. 
Primarily these concerns centered on an overarching theme that documentation was much more 
difficult than the OECD and governments understood. Taxpayers enumerated a variety of 
challenges or barriers to their immediate, low-burden compliance with the master file, CbC 
template, and local file approach. These difficulties included: existing reporting systems not 
aligned to the requested information; different reporting and measurement approaches within 
different parts of a multinational and across multinationals; difficulty in securing the information 
in a timely fashion; need to re-work data from affiliates into a consistent reporting format; cost of 
gathering requested data; burden from uncertainty in definitions and applications (e.g., what 
counts as an employee). Not surprisingly, given these articulated objections, taxpayers raised the 
most questions about the CbC template. 
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Despite this general critique, taxpayers seem to vary considerably in their response to the release 
of the recommendations under Action Item 13. MNEs have pursued one or more of the following 
steps: (a) reported that their operations are significantly out-of-step with the kinds of data sought; 
(b) used the OECD comment period to press for modifications; (c) tested their ability to comply 
with the master file, CbC template, local file structure; and (d) explored new information 
management systems to facilitate their compliance with anticipated reporting requirements.  
Some taxpayers may already be collecting much of the master file and template information in 
order to comply with existing, country specific reporting requirements imposed by jurisdictions 
already requiring reporting on the worldwide activities of its MNEs, including information on 
certain foreign subsidiaries. 
 
3.3.5.2 Delivery Mechanism. Among the most controversial issues raised by the Action Item 
13 steps is the question of how the required information (master file, template, local file) will be 
delivered. For example, will taxpayers only be required to file the information with the 
jurisdiction of the multinational’s parent corporation – with the expectation that countries will 
request the information via treaty information exchange provisions? If so, what kind of showing, 
or demonstration of need for the information would be required? Alternatively, would taxpayers 
be required to directly file in each jurisdiction in which they are a taxpayer (e.g., an affiliate or a 
permanent establishment)?  Would some but not all information be filed directly with the local 
affiliate’s taxing jurisdiction?  
 
Taxpayers have generally urged that required filings be made to the country of the MNE’s parent 
corporation. The primary argument advanced for the single central filing (at least of the master 
file and the CbC template) is the concern that some jurisdictions might not adequately protect 
information. If the data is provided only to the parent jurisdiction and then shared via treaty 
request, there would be additional protection because countries requesting pursuant to a treaty 
must ensure and commit to specified confidentiality requirements. 
 
The significance of this taxpayer concern turns on two points: the legitimacy of the concern over 
protection of taxpayer information, and the sensitive nature of the data. First, appropriate 
protection of taxpayer data is an accepted norm, although there are differences in exactly what is 
protected, when and how. Model exchange of information provisions (e.g., Article 26 of the UN 
Model Treaty or the OECD Model Treaty) reference the expectations regarding taxpayer 
privacy, and expound further on the application of this standard in the accompanying 
commentaries. However, sharing the master file and CbC template via treaty poses challenges 
for requesting jurisdictions, particularly developing countries. See 3.3.6. 
 
Second, regardless of the broader subject of taxpayer privacy, to the extent information in the 
master file and the CbC template is generally publicly available for these multinationals, the 
argument in favor of filing those documents only with the parent’s jurisdiction may be 
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weakened. For example, in the case of publicly traded entities, how much of the information is 
publicly reported in compliance with securities (or other) regulations? Are there other public 
sources for that information? If so, how much weight should be given to arguments about 
uncertain protection of the data? Alternatively, should the public availability of data be less 
relevant in the debate if the “public” information is cumbersome to gather? This argument would 
be grounded on the assumption that difficult to assemble data is in reality “less public” and thus 
there is a real impact on these taxpayers if their well-organized reporting to the tax authorizes is 
inadvertently made public. Should privately-held multinationals be treated differently if their 
publicly available entity information is more limited? 
 
The importance of this issue to both countries and taxpayers has led the OECD to defer a 
recommendation on the delivery mechanism in order to provide more time to evaluate concerns 
and consider possible options. A recommendation on the delivery mechanism(s) is anticipated by 
January 2015. 
 
3.3.5.3 Use of Information. Related to the delivery mechanism concern (3.3.5.2) is the 
separate question of which files a country may access and what it may appropriately do with the 
information? Taxpayers typically have several concerns about what jurisdictions might do with 
information compiled by taxpayers. 
 
Replace audit: One concern articulated by taxpayers is that countries, particularly those that may 
be resource constrained, will use the master file and the template data as the basis for an actual 
transfer pricing allocation. For example, if such a jurisdiction draws the conclusion that 
inadequate income (and thus tax) is being reported in its jurisdiction relative to the value chain, 
functions, and reporting of income worldwide, the tax authorities might simply stop at that stage 
and make a transfer pricing adjustment. The OECD has stated that the purpose of the master file 
and the template is to facilitate risk assessment and decisions about where to allocate audit 
resources – not to replace the audit. However, the spring 2014 revisions to the January 
Discussion Draft (see 3.3.4) include an even more explicit statement that the master file and CbC 
template are understood to be high-level and not expected to displace audit of the taxpayer. 
 
Shift to Formulary: Relatedly, taxpayers are also concerned that countries may use this 
information (master file and template) to shift informally to a formulary approach to transfer 
pricing, despite formally being committed to an arm’s length approach. In part, countries might 
be inclined to use the information in this way if they find it difficult to locate comparables for the 
traditional application of the arm’s length method.  Again, developing countries in particular, 
may face this challenge.  See 3.3.6. Although substantive reforms to transfer pricing rules are not 
part of Action Item 13, this taxpayer concern reveals the connection between administration, 
documentation and substantive law.  
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Assist Beyond Transfer Pricing: Should countries use some of this high-level information, in 
particular the CbC template, to assist more broadly in efforts to combat base erosion and profit 
shifting? The OECD’s plan to treat the template as separate supports the view that the template 
can and should play a broader role in helping jurisdictions make their high-level assessments of 
risk. The final form of the template and the specific columns of information provided will impact 
how countries can effectively use the filings to reach beyond transfer pricing concerns to other 
causes of base erosion. 
 
Format and Function: Taxpayers have raised a variety of questions regarding exactly how to 
properly report data, especially under the CbC template. Examples include how to handle various 
accounting differences within the multinational group, how to define “employees,” and how to 
treat permanent establishments. Depending on the intended and appropriate uses of the data, it 
may be possible to determine the best, or the appropriate responses, to these questions. For 
example, the decision to require reporting only the number of employees and not their 
compensation likely reflected a conclusion that the burden of trying to ascertain what counts as 
compensation for all employees across entities and jurisdictions was not necessary for a high-
level risk assessment given the burden it might impose. “Numbers of employees” in each 
jurisdiction might be an adequate and less burdensome measure of the MNE’s presence in a 
country. Similarly, the flexibility permitted in sourcing financial data presumably reflected the 
view that a steady comparative picture of the MNE’s activities across countries and years was 
the core of the high-level risk assessment intended by the master file and template. However, the 
decision as to whether to report information bottom-up, or top-down, (see 3.3.3.1.1.), has been 
viewed by some as critical to the template’s meaningful role in providing even a high-level risk 
assessment. Under this view, bottom-up reporting would effectively replicate the base erosion 
and profit shifting already in place and thus fail to signal the real risk to the tax authorities; only 
top down reporting would be able to reveal even the high-level risk of BEPS problems for the 
jurisdiction. 
 
3.3.5.4 Data Protection. In addition to the concern expressed by countries regarding how the 
master file and template will be reported and shared, see 3.3.5.2., is the general focus on data 
protection. As discussed in 3.3.5.2, a recommendation that MNEs file the information only with 
the parent jurisdiction and sharing it only with countries committed to data protection consistent 
with the model treaties, provides a measure of certainty regarding data protection. As the OECD 
explores various alternatives for filing and sharing this information, taxpayers will continue to 
press for assurances of confidentiality. 
 
In the context of BEPS, it is useful to note that data protection has a special meaning beyond the 
typical concern that countries might either carelessly allow public access to private commercial 
or tax information, or intentionally share information with state-owned competitors or with 
favored domestic competitors. The increased public awareness of the role and conduct of 
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multinationals in the economy and the related BEPS issues has led to calls for public disclosure 
of some, or all, of the information that would be provided by businesses to tax authorities under 
the BEPS initiatives.21 Under the view that citizens should be able to assess and evaluate their 
own government’s conduct with MNEs, and should be able to ensure that the country and the 
fisc are properly protected, public release of some or all of the master file and template data 
would likely be sought. Although the OECD has repeatedly asserted that this information is 
intended only for the governments and only for the purposes of making risk assessments for 
BEPS, taxpayers remain concerned that once the information is compiled and organized, there 
will be strong pressure at least in some countries for disclosure. 
 
3.3.5.5 Independent Country Action. One important and parallel thread in the entire BEPS 
process is the distinct possibility that countries may pursue unilateral responses to their BEPS 
problems. Such action could be in advance of broad agreement on BEPS steps or 
contemporaneous with it. Additionally, as noted above in 3.3.5.1., some countries already 
impose fairly extensive reporting obligations on their own multinationals, as well as other 
entities doing business in the jurisdiction. The risk or possibility of independent unilateral action 
by countries on BEPS problems is relevant throughout the debates over specific BEPS 
recommendations. For example, in measuring and evaluating the burden imposed on taxpayers 
by the requirements under the master file, CbC template, and local file, it is fair to consider the 
reduction in burden that corporations may experience through such a unified and streamlined 
reporting system. Similarly, taxpayers themselves may reassess their resistance to the OECD 
BEPS project given the risk of multiple, country-specific reporting requirements that might arise 
should the BEPS project not move forward with some success. Such individual country 
requirements seem all the more possible given that countries could use the Action Item 13 
proposed master file and template as a baseline in crafting their own reporting legislation. This 
“risk” of independent action by countries may be greatest with respect to those jurisdictions that 
have some leverage in the market. In contrast, a developing country that perceives itself as 
having more limited negotiating power vis a vis multinationals may be less inclined to impose 
independent reporting requirements perceived as “unfriendly” to business. Effectively countries 
could be competing on their relative lack of disclosure. Those developing countries might find it 
advantageous if a uniform standard of reporting is broadly adopted (along the lines of BEPS 
Action Item 13). 
 
There is, however, another completely separate dimension of independent country action in the 
context of the BEPS project: how will countries effectuate their support for and participation in 
the BEPS recommendations? Presumably, a multilateral commitment mechanism of some type 
will be needed. Additionally, countries will need to modify their domestic law consistent with 
                                                          
21 See, e.g., C20 Position Paper Background: Governance (7 August 2014) at 5 (advocating a “commitment to make 
public country-by-country reporting the global standard” on the view that “[e]nsuring this information is made 
public would enable tax administrators in the poorest countries to easily access this information and address base 
erosion and profit shifting”).  
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the various accepted recommendations that emerge from the multi-stage BEPS process. These 
realities are not unique to Action Item 13. But the effort to resolve the delivery mechanism 
question (for the master file and template) will be one important piece of the BEPS 
implementation process. 
 
3.3.6. Developing Country Issues Regarding Action Item 13.  
Although all countries share many of the same concerns, questions, and goals regarding the 
reporting recommendations under Action Item 13, developing countries may have a distinct 
perspective. Both in terms of the overall mission of Action Item 13 and the implementation-
specific decisions, developing countries should evaluate the BEPS project against their own 
circumstances. 
  
3.3.6.1 Overall Perspective. The broad mission of Action Item 13 to improve countries’ risk 
assessments for BEPS (through the master file and CbC template) and to facilitate transfer 
pricing audits (through the local file) is likely important to developing countries with limited 
audit and other resources. First, to the extent developing countries must decide where to direct 
their most sophisticated audit resources, they would want to identify their most serious base 
erosion and profit shifting problems. A high-level assessment tool (master file and template) 
delivered by each MNE operating in the jurisdiction would provide the country with a solid basis 
for making that preliminary risk assessment and assigning audit resources.  
 
Second, if the package (the master file, template, and local file as detailed by Action Item 13) 
becomes the standard for MNEs, then developing countries will be able to rely on a unified 
format as they make both high-level risk assessment decisions and as they evaluate taxpayer 
specific transactions among related entities. Both their own MNEs, as well as foreign 
multinationals conducting business in their jurisdiction, will be utilizing the same format and 
standards, producing more uniform information that may be more readily subject to comparison.  
Again, for a jurisdiction with limited resources, this enhanced uniformity in reporting (assuming 
it carries the requisite content) should allow the tax administration to more effectively process 
and evaluate the information – and train new tax professionals. 
 
Third, assuming broad support for Action Item 13 recommendations is ultimately achieved, 
and that this support is manifest in some type of commitment across countries, then developing 
countries should benefit from the “global” obligation imposed on MNEs to prepare this 
information. If many countries, including countries with more enforcement resources, will be 
seeking the information, presumably taxpayers will more readily comply. Moreover, this 
compliance would likely be not just in name (e.g., providing documents labeled “master file” and 
“template”) but also in spirit (providing materials meeting the expectations articulated for each 
of these documents). Thus, use of the BEPS process to enhance information reporting and 
document production by MNEs offers certain advantages for resource-constrained jurisdictions. 
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3.3.6.2 Implementation-Specific Perspective. Although the driving purpose behind Action 
Item 13 would be compatible with and help facilitate most developing countries’ audit and 
enforcement goals, the details regarding the actual implementation of Action Item 13 are critical 
to their real world impact.  Both the final content of the master file, CbC template, and the local 
file, and the manner in which this information is provided to countries ultimately determine 
whether the potential value of Action Item 13 is realized. 
 
3.3.6.2.1 Content. Several of the design questions that have arisen in the context of crafting 
the master file, template and local file may be particularly relevant for developing countries.  
  
Reporting entities. First, given that developing countries may find they have many permanent 
establishments operating in their jurisdiction, it will be important to clarify how that kind of 
presence in a jurisdiction will be handled for reporting purposes. Presumably, to the extent that 
the CbC reporting is country-based, the data from the permanent establishments should be picked 
up. But clarification on this point may be valuable. For example, the enumerated listing of 
entities operating in the jurisdiction should include not only local subsidiaries of the foreign 
multinational, but also the foreign corporations with a permanent establishment in the 
jurisdiction. 
 
Accounting. Second, as initially noted above in 3.3.3.1.1, and 3.3.5.3, countries in general, but 
developing countries especially, might prefer the top-down allocation of group income to the 
extent they are concerned that use of the local statutory accounts to construct a bottom-up 
reporting may disguise underlying BEPS problems. If the local statutory accounts reflect 
inappropriate pricing and profit shifting, that reality might be built into the template responses 
and effectively obscure the base erosion and profit shifting. This concern is not unique to 
developing countries. But the template may play a more pivotal role in developing countries tax 
enforcement process if they lack other reporting mechanisms or information that could signal a 
risk for base erosion and profit shifting with a particular taxpayer. 
 
Verification. Third, although there is attention to the source of data used in constructing the files, 
there has been less attention to verification of the information. Of course, verification of data is 
always an issue for tax authorities. If there are expectations regarding a country’s ability to verify 
information it would be useful to outline that more specifically. This concern may be most 
prominent in the local file context because that information would likely be circulated to a more 
limited pool of tax authorities. In contrast, the master file and template would likely receive 
wider circulation (although, as noted, the delivery mechanism will not be determined until 
January 2015). It is not clear, though, whether a jurisdiction that finds the master file or template 
inaccurate would be expected to unilaterally share that information with other countries in 
possession of the file or template. 
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Language. Fourth, the current proposals anticipate that the master file (and the template) would 
be prepared in English but that the local file would be prepared in the local language of the 
jurisdiction. Certainly, it is likely to be more efficient for the developing country that the master 
file be in English as compared to the language of the MNE’s parent jurisdiction (assuming that 
language is not English). However, the personnel constraints that developing country tax 
administrations face include the limited pool of English-speaking tax professionals with 
sufficient international tax training to effectively review the files, make risk assessments, and 
then pursue taxpayer audits where appropriate. If more information is made available in the 
language of the developing country, the number of tax professionals in government available to 
work on audits, reviews, and examinations may increase. 
 
Burden. Fifth, the dominant taxpayer critique of the Action Item 13 reporting (master file, 
template, and local file) has been that of the burden it imposes on taxpayers.  See 3.3.5.1. 
Although the question of burden is important, and requested information should be useful and 
reasonable in context, the balance of benefit and burden may look different from a developing 
country perspective. Taxpayers have urged that they not be asked to provide difficult to gather 
data that a country will be unable to use. This objection is not leveled solely at developing 
countries, but it is one that is heightened where a country has limited resources and is ultimately 
constrained in its ability to meaningfully process information. However, despite this claim, 
which might suggest that the benefits to developing countries would be less than the burden to 
the taxpayer, a broader look at the benefits and burden question might produce a different 
conclusion. Developing countries are often understood to be highly dependent on income taxes, 
specifically corporate income taxes, for their revenue base. There are a number of factors 
contributing to this fiscal picture and although it may shift in the long term, at present there is a 
serious cost to the fiscal welfare and stability of these countries when they are unable to collect 
corporate income tax otherwise due. Additionally, developing countries have fewer internal 
resources to engage in extensive monitoring and reviewing of multinational taxpayers and their 
tax planning. Thus, the benefit to these jurisdictions in having MNEs provide relatively uniform, 
comprehensive information of both a qualitative and quantitative nature that assists in risk 
assessment and in audit is distinctly valuable. That said, the BEPS project is a group effort by 
countries to respond to base erosion and profit shifting. However, in making a group-wide 
assessment of the burden imposed on taxpayers by Action Item 13 as compared to the benefit for 
tax administration, it will be important to bear in mind that the benefit should not be measured 
solely from a developed country perspective.22 
                                                          
22 Various international groups have urged that the BEPS Project appropriately incorporate the views and needs of 
developing countries. See, e.g., C20 Position Paper Background: Governance (7 August 2014) (recommending “an 
inclusive and transparent process that ensures developing countries benefit from these tax reforms,”); G20s Leaders’ 
Declaration (5-6 September 2013) at 13 (“Developing countries should be able to reap the benefits of a more 
transparent international tax system, and to enhance their revenue capacity, as mobilizing domestic resources is 
critical to financing development.”). 
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3.3.6.2.2 Delivery. Just as the question of to whom information will be provided and how, 
is very significant for taxpayers, it is equally critical to developing countries. As suggested in 
3.3.6.1, Action Item 13 will play little meaningful role if countries cannot predictably and 
effectively access the information in the master file, template, and local file. Given that many of 
the key advantages of this information package for developing countries derive from the 
resource-savings opportunities it provides (see 3.3.6 above), it is important that countries have 
easy access to the information in a timely fashion. To the extent that the delivery mechanism 
imposes costs, the value of the entire process for developing countries is diminished. 
 
For example, if the master file and template is provided only to the MNE parent’s jurisdiction, 
with the expectation that other countries can seek that information through an exchange of 
information request, several barriers are created. First, the developing country must pursue the 
process of requesting the information, presumably pursuant to a treaty (bilateral treaty or TIEA).  
This step requires the efforts of a tax professional sufficiently familiar with the process, the rules, 
and possibly a foreign language. Second, it is not clear what information the requesting 
jurisdiction must provide to make this request. One of the long standing problems with treaty-
based exchange of information provisions has been the requirement imposed on requesting 
jurisdictions to provide upfront details regarding the underlying taxpayer and the matter being 
investigated. This requirement would contradict one of the core functions of Action Item 13 – 
allowing countries to make more meaningful BEPS risk assessment early in the process. Yet 
depending on the precise treaty provision under which the country is making the request for 
information, they might need to know much more information in order to request the master file 
and template. Not only would this be difficult to accomplish in some cases, it will inevitably 
require more audit resources just to secure the information intended to provide the risk 
assessment tools. Developing countries will be able to take these steps for fewer taxpayers, thus 
decreasing the beneficial impact of Action Item 13. 
 
Second, tax administrations generally are seeking to make the audit process more 
contemporaneous. Working through a treaty mechanism to obtain the master file and template, 
particularly if the requesting country must provide detailed supporting information, would only 
extend the audit process. 
 
Third, developing countries are less likely to have MNEs with the parent located in their 
jurisdiction. As a result, a much larger portion of their enforcement work to combat BEPS would 
require the preliminary step of seeking master files and templates from other countries. In 
contrast, developed countries typically have more multinationals headquartered in their 
jurisdictions and would (under a system of filing only in the parent country) have the information 
automatically available. Moreover, these developed countries would likely be especially, though 
not exclusively, interested in base erosion and profit shifting on the part of their own major 
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multinationals. Thus, although all countries would (under this approach) be required to seek 
information via treaty, the burden would be most significant for developing countries which are 
resource constrained, are dependent on corporate income taxes, and have few domestic 
multinationals. 
 
3.3.6.2.3 Domestic. The proposed steps under Action Item 13 raise several questions for 
countries to consider from a domestic perspective. As with some of the observations above, 
although these points may not apply uniquely to developing countries, they may resonate 
strongly with developing countries.  First, assuming the countries adopt the recommendations 
under Action Item 13 in some final form, domestic legislation would be required to fully 
implement the recommendation. To the extent countries have not yet implemented significant 
reporting requirements for MNEs they would likely need to do so now. Given the importance of 
obtaining the information, developing countries would want to ensure their ability to enact the 
required legislation.  
 
Second, taxpayers have expressed the concern that countries, especially developing countries, 
may be inclined to by-pass a real audit, and use the master file and CbC template to impose a 
transfer pricing adjustment based on a more formulary approach. Some taxpayers have urged that 
the OECD secure commitments from countries affirming that they will not forgo the arm’s 
length method, even informally. It is unclear what such a commitment would look like and 
whether and how the final recommendations under Action Item 13 would incorporate it. But it 
does make sense for jurisdictions, including developing countries, to review their own positions 
and commitments on the subject. 
 
Third, taxpayers have also repeatedly raised confidentiality as an objection to widespread filing 
of the master file and CbC template. Regardless of the delivery mechanism(s) identified in 
January 2015, countries receiving access to information will likely be expected to demonstrate 
their ability and willingness to comply with norms of confidentiality and privacy regarding 
taxpayer information. If a country’s current domestic law is not consistent with the typical 
expectations reflected in, for example, the UN and OECD Article 26, the country may wish to 
preemptively re-visit the changes that would necessary to domestic law for compliance. 
  
Fourth, Action Item 13 itself does not impose documentation or transfer pricing penalties. That 
remains the province of the individual countries. The Discussion Draft recommends against 
documentation penalties for good faith compliance that falls short of the required disclosures. 
But the Discussion Draft anticipates the need for both documentation and mispricing penalties in 
some cases. As countries examine their own documentation and substantive pricing penalties, it 
is important to bear in mind the risk that taxpayers will “favour” jurisdictions with more severe 
penalties: taxpayers might devote more resources to documentation compliance in such 
jurisdictions and, where in doubt on pricing, shift profits to the jurisdiction with higher penalties 
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(to avoid the imposition of such penalties). Given that developed countries frequently have well-
established transfer pricing documentation and substantive penalties regimes, developing 
countries should carefully evaluate their own penalty regimes with these observations in mind. 
 
3.3.6.3 Options. Assuming that developing countries secure workable access to the master 
file and the CbC template under the final delivery mechanism, there remains the question of how 
they can best use this information. Given the resource constraints faced by many developing 
countries, targeted capacity building might enhance these countries’ ability to use the 
information received from all three formats (master file, CbC template, and local file) in a 
strategic manner. For example, training for developing country tax auditors could focus on the 
information included in these files and how to use that information to make overall risk 
assessments, and where appropriate to pursue taxpayer level audits. Using “case studies” of 
hypothetical taxpayers with corresponding master files, templates and local files would help 
developing countries not only receive the information but begin to use it effectively and more 
immediately to tackle base erosion and profit shifting.23 Real-time technical assistance and 
capacity building could also be pursued through the “Tax Inspectors Without Borders” 
program24 currently being piloted by the OECD, which provides expertise to developing country 
tax administrations during the course of real-time audit and enforcement.25 The G20 has noted its 
support for this program.26 
 
3.3.7 Summary of Action Item 13: The BEPS Project’s Action Item 13 addresses the challenge 
of transfer pricing documentation and the need to understand a multinational's activities across 
the globe. The Action Item introduces three new reporting mechanisms: (1) the Master file 
(standardized information for the entire MNE group regarding business activities, finance, debt 
structure, taxation and allocation of income); (2) the Country-by-Country Reporting template (a 
template completed by each multinational providing data on a country-by-country basis on seven 
key questions); and (3) the Local file (jurisdiction-specific information on the local entities, their 
financial accounts, financial data of comparables for transfer pricing analysis, and detailed 
information on related party transactions).  
                                                          
23 See, e.g., African Tax Administration Forum, A Practical Guide on Information Exchange for Developing 
Countries (2013) at 46-47 (outlining an abbreviated version of the case study concept in the context of requesting 
information). 
24 See generally, OECD website at http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxinspectors.htm. 
25 OECD Task Force on Tax and Development, Final Report on the Feasibility Study into the Tax Inspectors 
Without Borders Imitative (5 June 2013) at 1 (“Experts would be deployed to work directly with local tax officials 
on current audits and audit-related issues concerning international tax matters, and to share general audit practices. 
In addition to improvements in the quality and consistency of audits and the transfer of knowledge to recipient 
administrations (tax administrations seeking assistance), broader benefits are also anticipated including the potential 
for more revenues, greater certainty for taxpayers and encouraging a culture of compliance through more effective 
enforcement.), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/TIWB_feasibility_study.pdf. 
26 G20 Leaders’ Declaration (St. Petersburg, September, 2013) at 13 (“we welcome the OECD Tax Inspectors 
without Borders initiative, which aims to share knowledge and increase domestic capacities in developing countries 
in the tax area.”). 
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The goal of this reporting is to assist countries in (1) risk assessment; (2) enforcing transfer 
pricing requirements; and (3) audit. The proposed reporting under Action Item 13 has raised a 
number of implementation issues: (1) burden on the taxpayer, (2) the timing of when information 
must be provided, (3) scaling documentation requirements to reflect the materiality of the 
taxpayer and the transactions (based on the size and nature of the local economy, and the size 
and nature of the MNE and its activities both globally and locally), (4) expectations regarding 
document retention and updates, (5) language requirements for reporting, (6) nature and impact 
of documentation penalties, (7) confidentiality, and (8) actual implementation (domestic law 
changes, oversight of taxpayer reporting, mechanism for delivering information (centralized to 
MNE parent, locally, or other options). Among some of the most important concerns that have 
emerged regarding the design and implementation challenges are: (1) burden: the gap between 
how MNEs manage their group reporting and the expectations under Action Item 13; (2) delivery 
mechanism: the need to ensure taxpayer confidentiality while also ensuring meaningful access to 
reported information especially by developing countries; (3) use of information: expectation that 
template not lead countries to by-pass audit and directly impose a transfer pricing adjustment, 
and expectation that countries not abandon arm’s length approach.  
 
Developing countries may want to devote particular attention to a few key issues in Action Item 
13: (1) the broad goal of Action Item 13 (to improve information necessary for tax authorities to 
make valid risk assessments) may be especially valuable to resource constrained developing 
countries which must decide where and how to allocate scarce audit resources; (2) relatedly, if 
the Action Item 13 reporting package (Master file, CbC template, and Local file) become the 
MNE standard, the increased reporting uniformity should also help developing countries 
conserve and best direct their tax and audit resources; (3) choice of reporting language can also 
directly impact developing countries’ ability to access information, thus reporting at least the 
local file in the local language may be very important; (4) if MNE’s provide the information 
directly to the parent’s home jurisdiction with the expectation that other countries then request 
some or all of the information, the actual availability of the data will be diminished for 
developing countries that have a smaller treaty network and/or limited tax enforcement staff to 
make the treaty-based inquiries for all information sought; (5) ability to ensure confidentiality 
under domestic law; and (6) the capacity building support that would benefit the developing 
country in making the most of information available under the Action Item 13 reporting package. 
3.4. Disclosure of Aggressive Tax Planning: BEPS Action Item 12. 
Action Item 13 is not the only part of the BEPS project seeking increased information from 
taxpayers. Action Item 12 targets aggressive tax planning arrangements and seeks taxpayer 
disclosures regarding these structures. As noted in 3.1, this topic has a delivery date of 
September 2015 and will likely receive more scrutiny in the coming year. 
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3.4.1 Goals of Action Item 12. Based on the view that countries can more effectively tackle 
base erosion and profit shifting if they receive timely and relevant information, Action Item 12 
seeks to require disclosure regarding aggressive planning. Paralleling the work currently being 
undertaken for Action Item 13, the work for Item 12 will include the design of a reporting 
standard and a mechanism for sharing information among taxing jurisdictions. Many of the same 
concerns raised under Action Item 13 for both taxpayers and governments will also arise 
including: taxpayer burden, consistency, country-specific needs, value of qualitative and group-
wide information. The BEPS Action Plan anticipates that the recommendations under Action 
Item 12: 
 
will use a modular design allowing for maximum consistency but 
allowing for country specific needs and risks. One focus will be 
international tax schemes, where the work will explore using a wide 
definition of “tax benefit” in order to capture such transactions. The 
work will be co-ordinated with the work on co-operative compliance. 
It will also involve designing and putting in place enhanced models of 
information sharing for international tax schemes between tax 
administrations.27 
 
Given the thematic and structural overlap between Action Item 12 and Action Item 13, the 
conclusions reached regarding questions such as taxpayer burdens and the format for delivering 
the master file and CbC template under Action Item 13 will likely impact the future 
recommendations under Action Item 12.  
 
Although all countries should be concerned about the impact of aggressive tax planning 
structures and transactions on their tax base, many developing countries may find that their more 
immediate BEPS threat come from “straightforward” profit shifting. In that case, the 
recommendations under Action Item 13 may have more significant, immediate relevance to such 
countries. That said, if developing countries currently experiencing base erosion and profit 
shifting through more traditional transfer pricing mechanisms successfully curb this loss of tax 
revenue, they may find that taxpayers shift to more sophisticated techniques for reducing their 
tax bill. At that point, Action Item 12 would take on a greater role in developing countries’ 
response to base erosion and profits shifting. 
3.5. Summary of the BEPS Project and Transparency and Disclosure: 
The BEPS Action Plan includes two Action Items directly bearing on transparency and 
disclosure. Action Item 12, which will be delivered in 2015, seeks to require disclosure of 
aggressive tax planning. Many of the issues and concerns that have emerged in the formulation 
and evaluation of Action Item 13 over the past year will likely become important again in the 
                                                          
27 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (July 2013) at 22. 
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context of Action Item 12. Perhaps of greater importance for developing countries now are the 
recommendations under Action Item 13 pertaining to documentation of transfer pricing and the 
multinational group. This Action Item has been the subject of extensive debate and comment and 
its three part reporting package (Master file, CbC template, and Local file) could play a very 
significant role in developing country tax enforcement. Additionally, Action Item 11 might play 
a role in the future to the extent that its anticipated collection of broad level data regarding the 
success of strategies targeting base erosion and profit shifting provides guidance on future 
reform. 
4. Other New Developments in Transparency and Disclosure. 
4.1 Overview. 
The BEPS project is the most expansive effort to address base erosion and profit shifting, 
including through transparency and disclosure. But it is not the only venue for such action. Other 
work on transparency, disclosure, and exchange of information is taking place at the national, 
regional, and global level – including at the OECD. A review of these efforts helps provide a 
more complete picture of the tools being developed to enhance countries’ ability to enforce their 
tax laws in a global economy. 
4.2 Automatic Exchange of Information.  
4.2.1 Overview. Before the BEPS project began, countries were struggling with the question of 
how to improve access to taxpayer information and thus improve tax enforcement. Although 
global taxpayers are not new and exchange of information provisions have existed in bilateral tax 
treaties for decades, the explosion of cross border commercial activity and investment by 
businesses and individuals has increased tax authorities’ need for information location outside 
their jurisdiction. Existing exchange of information provisions in bilateral tax treaties were 
insufficient, in part because they generally call for exchange of information upon request. But 
that process can be slow, burdensome, and difficult for requesting countries (see 5.2). Many in 
the international tax community advocated for automatic exchange of information – a process 
and commitment between or among jurisdictions to regularly send a country specified types of 
tax-related information regarding that country’s taxpayers. Others though resisted on various 
grounds including: domestic traditions of bank secrecy, administrative burden, recipient’s 
inability to meaningfully process large quantities of information, and privacy concerns. Perhaps 
less often acknowledged is the tax competition reason to resist automatic exchange of 
information. Countries which impose low taxes on outsiders investing in or through their 
jurisdiction would see little upside to helping the home country impose tax and thereby negate 
the “value” of “investing” in that low tax jurisdiction. 
 
4.2.2 Current Practices. At present, neither the UN nor the OECD Model Treaty version of 
Article 26 (Exchange of Information) requires automatic exchange (see 5.2). However, the UN 
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Commentary offers alternative Article 26 language that would include automatic exchange of 
information as part of the states’ commitment.28 The OECD Commentary for Art. 26 similarly 
considers automatic exchange of information as one of mechanisms available for countries to 
adopt.29 The OECD Model Tax Information Exchange Agreement, which formally uses the on-
request mode of exchanging information, envisions in its Commentary that countries could use 
the document for automatic exchange of information subject to agreement by the two states.30 
The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters provides for 
automatic exchange of information between members pursuant to terms mutually agreed to by 
those states. (See 5.4). 
 
The European Union’s Administrative Cooperation Directive requires mandatory automatic 
exchange of information, effective 1 January 2015. The Directive mandates automatic exchange 
of information in specified categories: employment income, directors’ fees, life insurance 
products, pension, ownership and income from immovable property. The EU Savings Directive 
generally requires member countries to report interest income paid to an individual beneficial 
owner resident in another member state. 
 
4.2.3 Challenges. Successful “automatic exchange of information” requires several elements: 
(1) a common standard regarding information reporting, (2) due diligence by financial 
institutions, (3) an exchange process, (4) a legal framework through which to execute the 
exchange, and (5) compatible technical systems.31 Primary challenges with moving from the idea 
of automatic information exchange to the reality of widespread committed implementation have 
included: historic bank secrecy provisions, disagreement on the types information, reciprocity, 
confidentiality, taxpayer identification, data security, format and feasibility. The first challenge, 
bank secrecy, has been under attack since approximately 2009. Over the past five years, most 
countries have substantially limited or eliminated domestic rules on bank secrecy that barred 
their own financial institutions from providing client information (to the local government or 
foreign governments) and/or barred the country from providing that information to another 
country pursuant to an exchange of information request. 
 
4.2.4 OECD, G20 and Automatic Exchange. The remaining challenges have been the focus of 
global work over the past two years. As of April 2013, the G20 formally supported the “progress 
made towards automatic exchange of information which is expected to be the standard, and 
urged all jurisdictions to move towards exchanging information automatically with their treaty 
                                                          
28 UN Model Treaty Commentary, Article 26, Paragraph 29.2, 30. 
29 OECD Model Treaty Commentary, Article 26, Paragraph 9, 9.1. 
30 OECD Model Tax Information Exchange Agreement Commentary, Article 5, Paragraph 39. 
31 OECD, Automatic Exchange of Information: What it is, How it works, Benefits, What remains to be done (2012), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/automaticexchangeofinformationreporthtm.  
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partners, as appropriate.” 32 The G20 gave the OECD a mandate to prepare standards and 
guidance on automatic exchange of information. In February 2014, the OECD released the first 
part of this project, the “Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information: 
The Common Reporting Standard,”33 which the G20 approved: “We endorse the Common 
Reporting Standard for automatic exchange of tax information on a reciprocal basis and will 
work with all relevant parties, including our financial institutions, to detail our implementation 
plan at our September meeting.”34  
 
As a follow-up to its February 2014 document, the OECD released its more comprehensive 
“Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters” in July 
2014.35 This July OECD report includes: (1) the text of a Model Competent Authority 
Agreement (“CCA”) for automatic exchange of certain tax information, (2) the Common 
Reporting Standard (“CRS”), and (3) Commentary intended to facilitate uniform implementation 
of the agreement and standard. Exchange of information under this system requires that each 
country take two basic steps.  
 
First, countries must implement any domestic law changes necessary to (1) require financial 
entities to gather and report the designated information, and (2) ensure appropriate protection of 
taxpayer data. Second, countries (through their competent authorities) must agree to exchange on 
an automatic basis and must set the terms of that exchange (e.g., the Model Competent Authority 
Agreement). The report urges that this agreement be executed under the legal framework of the 
Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (see 5.4) because 
the convention allows for more than one country to enter into such competent authority 
agreement, potentially reducing the amount of negotiating a country must do. Alternatively, the 
competent authority agreement could be executed under two countries’ bilateral tax treaty. 
 
Much of the discussion and debate surrounding implementation of automatic exchange of 
information concerns the same questions that arose in considering the work under BEPS Action 
Item 13 – the information to be provided, the level of burden imposed, the usefulness of the 
information, and the protection of taxpayer data. One notable difference is that automatic 
                                                          
32 Communiqué Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Washington, 18-19 April 2013, 
available at http://g20.org/documents. 
33 OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information (February 2014), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/automatic-exchange-financial-account-information-common-
reporting-standard.pdf. 
34 Communiqué Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Washington, 18-19 April 2013, available 
at 
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Communique%20Meeting%20of%20G20%20Finance
%20Ministers%20and%20Central%20Bank%20Governors%20Sydney%2022-23%20February%202014_0.pdf. 
35 OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters (21 July 2014), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-
information-in-tax-matters.htm. 
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exchange of information places the reporting burden on third party financial entities, not the 
taxpayer.  
 
To the extent that the recommendations regarding automatic exchange of information in the July 
2014 OECD report form the baseline for automatic exchange of information relationships, 
developing countries must carefully evaluate whether its contents and structure would adequately 
meet their informational needs for the foreseeable future. Below in 4.3 the Common Reporting 
Standard and the Model Agreement are outlined briefly and then analyzed from a developing 
country perspective. 
4.3 Common Reporting Standard (“CRS”) and Model Competent Authority 
Agreement (“CAA”). 
4.3.1 Overview. The underlying goal of the OECD automatic exchange of information project 
is to put in place a system that: (1) enables the sharing of taxpayer information that is necessary 
to effective tax enforcement, and (2) does so in a manner that is sufficiently uniform and 
standardized that information can be efficiently provided, shared and processed. The OECD 
commented that it drew “extensively” on the intergovernmental response to the U.S. financial 
reporting requirements (the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, or “FATCA”) in designing 
the CRS. (See 4.5 for further discussion of the intergovernmental agreements). Under this 
system, certain financial entities have an obligation to report specified information on account 
holders to the tax authorities in the financial entity’s own jurisdiction. That jurisdiction would 
then share the account information with the country in which the account holder is a resident. 
The expectation is that the emerging standard and system would be a minimum standard of 
sharing information between jurisdictions. Countries could, of course, decide to exchange 
additional information. By spring of 2014 over 65 countries expressed commitment to implement 
automatic exchange.36 In March 2014, more than 40 countries formally agreed to early adoption 
of the Common Reporting Standard developed by the OECD, with implementation expected in 
2017.37 
 
4.3.2 CRS. The Common Reporting Standard details the entities that must report, the type of 
information to be reported, the types of accounts for which information must be reported, and the 
due diligence required of the reporting financial entities. 
 
Reporting Entities: Under the CRS, the following types of financial institutions are required to 
participate in reporting financial information of taxpayers: custodial institutions, depository 
                                                          
36 See OECD discussion and listing available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-
information/automaticexchange.htm.  
37 Joint Statement by the Early Adopters Group (March 2014) available at 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/AEOIjointstatement.pdf.  
36 
 
institutions, investment entities, and specified insurance companies (unless there is low risk of 
evasion). 
 
Information Provided: The types of financial information to be provided by the reporting 
financial entities include: interest, dividends, account balance or value, income from certain 
insurance produces, sales proceeds from financial assets, and other income generated by assets 
held in the account or payments made with respect to the account.38 
 
Covered Accounts: The accounts (“reportable accounts”) for which reporting must be made by 
the reporting financial entities include accounts held by individuals and entities (including trusts 
and foundations). To limit evasive tax planning, the reporting financial entities must look 
through passive entities and report on the controlling persons. In terms of providing identifying 
information regarding the account, the financial entity must report the “name, address, 
jurisdiction(s) of residence, TIN(s) and date and place of birth (in the case of an individual) of 
each Reportable Person that is an Account Holder.”39 
 
Due Diligence: To ensure meaningful and effective provision of information, reporting financial 
entities must perform a specified level of due diligence aimed at securing accurate information 
regarding the identity of the account holder. Different standards of diligence are applied 
depending on when the account was created, its contents, its value, and other information known 
to the financial entity. 
 
4.3.3 CAA. The Model Competent Authority Agreement is drafted as a bilateral agreement 
between two jurisdictions to commit to the automatic exchange of financial account information. 
(A model multilateral CAA is provided in Annex 1 of the July 2014 Document). Pursuant to the 
agreement, the countries agree to have domestic rules requiring financial institutions to report 
accounts and follow due diligence procedures consistent with Common Reporting Standard and 
the terms of the specific CAA. Additionally, the signatories confirm that they have: (1) the 
appropriate safeguards to protect the confidentiality of taxpayer data, and (2) the infrastructure 
necessary for effective exchange (including mechanisms for “timely, accurate, and confidential 
information exchanges, effective and reliable communications, and capabilities to promptly 
resolve questions and concerns about exchanges or requests for exchanges.”).40 
 
                                                          
38 OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters (21 July 2014) at 15, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-
information-in-tax-matters.htm. 
39 OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters (21 July 2014) at 29, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-
information-in-tax-matters.htm. 
40 OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters (21 July 2014) at 21-
22, available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-
financial-information-in-tax-matters.htm. 
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4.3.4 Developing Country Analysis.  
 
4.3.4.1 Overview. A range of developing countries have expressed interest in automatic 
exchange of information. Income tax evasion poses a serious fiscal challenge for many 
developing countries which rely substantially on the income tax base. Current methods for 
obtaining information located outside the jurisdiction can be costly or unavailable. Treaties 
generally permit exchange of information only on request (a process that can be burdensome in 
time, money and expertise). Moreover, many developing countries have a more limited treaty 
network (even including TIEAs), and may not have treaties with key tax haven jurisdictions 
(used by their residents in evading the developing country income tax). Thus, some developing 
countries are among those who have committed to early adoption of the Common Reporting 
Standard. (4.3.1) 
 
4.3.4.2 Advantages of the CRS and CAA. The overall automatic exchange of information 
project advances the potential for meaningful income tax enforcement. Widespread 
dissemination of relevant taxpayer information to the appropriate taxing authorities enhances real 
enforcement and more broadly signals to taxpayers the risks of tax evasion. As noted above 
(4.3.4.1) current information exchange mechanisms can be too burdensome to serve as a regular 
component of tax enforcement. Automatic, bulk provision of the enumerated information in the 
CRS would significantly reduce the costs of acquiring that information compared to existing 
mechanisms. Additionally, the automatic nature of the delivery reduces the opportunity for 
pressure, leverage, and corruption in tax administration. 
 
The scope of taxpayers whose accounts are covered by the CRS further increases the value of the 
information exchange. The decision to include entities and not just individuals, and to reach 
trusts and other often opaque holding structures, expands the coverage of this automatic 
exchange of information system beyond that of some other programs. 
 
4.3.4.3 Limitations of the CRS and CAA. The advantages described above of the CRS and 
CAA essentially reflect the reduced costs and difficulties of acquiring information as compared 
to obtaining it via an existing bilateral treaty.  But the ability to participate in the CRS and CAA 
is currently contingent on (1) meeting the standards necessary to commit to providing, not just 
receiving information (required reciprocity), and (2) getting key jurisdiction to sign a CAA 
(participation). 
 
4.3.4.3.1 Reciprocity. The CAA is premised on reciprocity between or among signatories.  
Although countries may sign a CAA in advance of being ready to participate, the agreement only 
takes effect when they are in fact prepared to reciprocally share information.41 The only option 
                                                          
41 See, e.g., Model Competent Authority Agreement, Section 7, available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-
tax-information/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-information-in-tax-matters.htm. 
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for non-reciprocal participation in the CRS and CAA is provided for countries which do “not 
need to be reciprocal” (e.g., because one of the jurisdictions does not have an income tax).42 This 
has been characterized by some commentators as intended to facilitate automatic exchange of 
information from tax havens. There is no current model or provision allowing for non-reciprocal 
automatic exchange of information with (or more precisely, to a developing country (i.e. 
providing information to that developing country without receiving information in return). The 
absence of such an alternative may render the current CRS and CAA out of reach of developing 
countries that cannot currently commit to and meet the standards for domestic collection of the 
required tax information (i.e. the domestic law provisions and enforcement of data collection 
from reporting financial entities) and the processing and transmission of the information (inside 
the tax administration). These developing countries though would benefit from the receipt of 
information under automatic information exchange. The only requirement they would need to 
meet is the protection of taxpayer data. Even if the developing country were not yet able to make 
maximum use of the bulk data it receives, the country could nonetheless begin to improve tax 
enforcement with the information. 
 
If non-reciprocity with developing countries were permitted, it could be managed in a gradual 
manner.  The country could commit to meeting established benchmarks for domestic information 
collection and processing. While the country was meeting the benchmarks, it could receive 
information under the CRS and CAA, with the end goal being full and reciprocal participation. 
The loss for the other country during this period of time would likely be minimal. Developing 
countries are typically not the financial destinations of major tax evaders, and developed 
countries would likely receive little significant information from this automatic exchange of 
information. Thus, the cost of helping developing countries improve tax collection while 
building their internal capacity to fully participate in automatic exchange should not be unduly 
high. 
 
4.3.4.3.2 Participation. Even with adequate infrastructure to participate in automatic 
exchange of information under the CRS and CAA, developing countries must actually be able to 
persuade countries to sign these agreements. The bilateral version offered as the main example of 
a CAA would be less effective for many developing countries.  It would have to be negotiated on 
a bilateral basis with each country and could only be completed with current treaty partners 
(bilateral tax treaties or TIEAs). The alternative, multilateral, version of a CAA provided in 
Annex 1 of the July 2104 OECD Document would be executed on the legal basis of the 
                                                          
42 See Nonreciprocal Model Competent Authority Agreement, in OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of 
Financial Account Information in Tax Matters (21 July 2014) Annex 2 at 223, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-information-in-
tax-matters.htm. 
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Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.43 This multilateral 
version would offer two key advantages to developing countries – only a single agreement to 
negotiate and a wide pool of potential signatory partners. There are, however, three problems.  
 
First, with the availability and prominence of the bilateral version there may be inadequate 
motivation for many countries to pursue the multilateral. Second, even if some countries do 
participate in a multilateral CAA, it is not clear that they would be required to invite a 
developing country to sign. Specifically, some developing countries that have been unable to 
sign treaties with tax havens may be concerned that tax havens will also refuse to participate in a 
CAA with them.  Yet these havens are key jurisdictions from which a developing country may 
need to acquire tax information, and unlike developed countries the developing country may 
have little leverage to persuade or entice the tax havens’ participation. Finally, unlike the U.S. 
FATCA regime which inspired the CRS and CAA, it is not clear what sanctions would apply to 
nonparticipants. The absence of sanctions may be a concern for developing countries that are 
trying to get tax havens to join them in a CAA. 
4.4 Industry Specific Reporting Requirements (Natural Resources, Financial 
Services). 
Industry specific country-by-country reporting has been also been a focus of increased 
transparency for countries. For example, United States securities law regulations now require 
extractive industries to report various payments made to foreign governments by businesses 
engaged in extractive industries (exploration, extraction, processing, and export of oil, natural 
gas, or minerals, or the acquisition of a license to engage in such activity). These payments, 
which must be reported on a country-by-country basis, include44 “taxes, royalties, fees (including 
license fees) production entitlements, bonuses, and other material benefit.” Implementation of 
these new requirements (enacted into law in 2010), however, awaits Securities and Exchange 
Commission implementing regulation.  
 
On a more global scale, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) seeks to promote 
a two pronged reporting approach for transparency in extractive industries45 under which 
businesses report what they pay to each jurisdiction, and the governments report what they 
receive.46 However, work on industry-targeted disclosure has not been limited to extractive 
industries. The European Union’s Capital Requirements Direction IV (CRD IV) seeks disclosure 
by covered financial institutions of information on a country-by-country basis including: profit or 
                                                          
43 OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters (21 July 2014) at 215, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-
information-in-tax-matters.htm. 
44 U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 13(q). 
45 EITI Fact Sheet 2014, available at http://eiti.org/files/2014-03-26%20Factsheet%20English_0.pdf. 
46 EITI Countries and Country Reports, available at http://eiti.org/countries. 
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loss before tax, tax paid, subsidies received, average number of employees.47 EU Member states 
must domestically enact rules to require the reporting.48 
 
In some cases, efforts to combat corruption prompted the push for transparency and disclosure 
initiatives. Where transparency and disclosure serves an anti-corruption role, the public release 
of disclosed information can be important. Not surprisingly, the nature and scope of any public 
disclosure of taxpayer data has generated debate and objection in the business community. 
 
Although the issue of public disclosure of taxpayer information has been raised by some 
advocates in the BEPS context, the OECD does not anticipate that Action Item 13 files would be 
made available to the public. But corruption concerns have surfaced as a possible factor in some 
countries’ limited collection of income tax, and public disclosure of at least some information in 
the master file, template, and/or local file could play a role in improving tax enforcement. 
4.5. Intergovernmental Agreements (“IGAs”) and Related Developments. 
In 2010, the United States enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”).49 
Prompted by the number of U.S. taxpayers using off-shore financial accounts to avoid U.S. 
income tax, the new legislation effectively requires a wide range of financial institutions (foreign 
and domestic) to provide data to the United States regarding U.S. taxpayers who hold accounts at 
those institutions. The FATCA legislation imposes due diligence and reporting burdens on these 
third party entities, and failure to comply can result in negative U.S. tax consequences for the 
financial institutions’ own U.S. source income.  
 
In an effort to streamline compliance for foreign financial entities required to report under 
FATCA, and to address various disclosure and confidentiality concerns, a number of countries 
entered into intergovernmental agreements (“IGAs”) with the United States that provided 
specific guidance on the type of information that their own domestic financial institutions would 
gather on U.S. taxpayers and detail how that information would be provided to the United 
States.50 These IGAs were negotiated under the legal framework of each country’s existing tax 
bilateral tax treaty with the United States. With the increasing number of IGAs being signed with 
the United States, other countries have expressed interest in receiving the same type of tax-
                                                          
47 See, e.g., http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:176:0338:0436:EN:PDF 
48 See, e.g., United Kingdom reporting rules came into effect in January 2014, with the first reporting required 1 July 
2014.  See Final UK regulations available at  http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/3118/made; see final UK 
guidance available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/capital-requirements-country-by-country-
reporting-regulations-2013-guidance/capital-requirements-country-by-country-reporting-regulations-2013-guidance.   
49 U.S. Internal Revenue Code Sections 1471-1474. 
50 Ultimately, the United States provided two model intergovernmental agreements that formed the basis of its 
negotiations with other countries, IGA Model 1 and Model 2. 
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related information on their own residents’ foreign financial accounts, and have pursued a 
broader IGA format.51 
4.6 Summary of Other Developments in Transparency and Disclosure: 
In addition to the BEPS project, there are several other global efforts to limit base erosion and 
profit shifting. The OECD and G20 have been advocating introduction of automatic exchange of 
information including a “Common Reporting Standard” for the information that should be 
exchanged. The OECD released its comprehensive standard in July 2014 (including the CRS 
itself), a Model Competent Authority Agreement, and a Commentary (to facilitate uniform 
implementation). The CRS specifies which financial entities must report taxpayer information, 
which information must be reported, and which accounts are subject to reporting. Exchange of 
information as a tool for transparency and disclosure avoids the burdens of pursuing exchange on 
request. But it still requires an agreement the exchange. The proposal to implement a multilateral 
CAA through the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters 
avoids the need to enter into many bilateral arrangements. This would be an advantage for 
countries with few current treaties and limited resources for tax administration. However, even 
this path (use of the Multilateral Convention) does not guarantee that crucial jurisdictions would 
agree to join a developing country in exchange of information. Another barrier for developing 
countries is the “reciprocal” nature of the CCA. Exchanges would only start after both countries 
could fully under the agreement. Phasing in reciprocity would allow developing countries to 
receive valuable tax information and tackle base erosion now as they build their internal capacity 
to comply with all of aspects of the CAA. Other potentially interesting initiatives for 
transparency and disclosure include: (1) efforts such as the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative which encourages industry-based reporting of tax payments (with both business and 
government reporting payments and receipts); and (2) bilateral and regional efforts to replicate 
the kind of information exchange being promised under IGAs that have been signed in the wake 
of the new U.S. reporting requirements for financial entities. 
5. Existing Mechanisms Supporting Transparency and Disclosure. 
5.1 Overview. 
Despite the significant attention directed at transparency and disclosure in recent years, the 
concepts are not new to the tax system. For example, tax treaties have included exchange of 
information provisions for decades, which though more limited in scope and effect than some of 
                                                          
51 See, e.g., Letter (9 April 2013) signed by finance ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom announcing their pilot program to automatically exchange information, a “multilateral exchange facility,” 
available at 
http://taxnews.lexisnexis.co.uk/TaxNewsLive/Members/BreakingNewsFullText.aspx?id=4335&css=1&xml=0. The 
signatories encouraged other EU member states to join them in their pilot program based on IGAs signed with the 
United States pursuant to FATCA. 
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the transparency and disclosure projects currently underway, nonetheless sought to enhance a tax 
administration’s access to vital taxpayer data. A brief review of these existing mechanisms which 
support and facilitate tax transparency and disclosure provides: (1) a better understanding of 
what may be needed in new mechanisms, and (2) the role that these current agreements or 
structures can play in supporting any new developments in transparency and disclosure. 
5.2 Model Treaty Article 26. 
Both the UN Model Treaty and the OECD Model Treaty include an Article 26 Exchange of 
Information provision that outlines the primary terms governing exchange of information 
between the two signatories: the duty to exchange, the duty to protect taxpayer information, the 
grounds upon which a request for information can be declined, and the grounds which do not 
form an appropriate basis for refusal to exchange information. Although the UN and OECD 
version of Article 26 (and their respective Commentaries) do differ in some regards, their 
common features are reflected in many countries own bilateral tax treaties and on balance share 
several common deficits. Moreover, as referenced below, both treaties have made changes to 
Article 26 in an effort to increase the likelihood of meaningful exchange of information. 
 
5.2.1 Standard Governing Requests. As noted earlier, neither the UN nor the OECD Model 
Article 26 requires automatic exchange of information. Thus, countries requesting information 
must meet certain thresholds for documenting their request (i.e. no “fishing expeditions”). This 
step limits jurisdictions to requesting information only about taxpayers and activities for which 
they already have some knowledge. Moreover, the specific threshold requirements imposed by 
existing bilateral tax treaties impact the likelihood that information can be requested. Recent 
changes to the UN Model Article 26 decreased the impact of these “thresholds.” For example, 
changes to the UN Model Treaty Art. 26(1) in 2011 sought to extend the scope of exchange of 
information by providing that information should be exchanged if it is “foreseeably relevant for 
carrying out the provisions of the Convention or to the administration or enforcement of 
domestic laws of the contracting States.” The phrase “foreseeably relevant” replaced the earlier 
term “necessary.”52 The Commentary to UN Model Treaty Article 26 does offer some alternative 
language for the new phrase “foreseeably relevant,” but these options are intended to allow treaty 
partners to choose language that they find clear in specifying the goal of “effective” exchange of 
information.53 
 
Despite the expanded scope of Art. 26 exchange of information under the “foreseeably relevant” 
language, it is important to note that automatic exchange of information entirely eliminates even 
a broad test for demonstrating the connection between the requested information and the taxing 
                                                          
52 The UN Commentary for Art. 26 characterized the change to “foreseeably relevant” as one that was not 
substantive. Rather, it was intended to “remove doubts” and “clarify” the prior language. Paragraph 4 of the 
Commentary on Article 26 of the United Nations Model Convention. 
53 The OECD Article 26 also uses the phrase “foreseeably relevant.” 
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authorities’ investigation. The automatic receipt of specified bulk data effectively would place no 
such constraints on jurisdictions seeking information in the designated categories. Additionally, 
the current, “on request” process requires an allocation of the requesting country’s potentially 
limited resources, which would be alleviated under automatic exchange of information. 
 
5.2.2 Bank Secrecy. Historically, states have declined to comply with a request for information 
under Article 26 on the grounds that compliance would violate domestic law, specifically, bank 
secrecy rules. To the extent many countries had such domestic law provisions severely limiting 
(often under significant penalty) at financial institutions ability to share information with the 
government regarding a client, and/or limiting the government’s ability to share such information 
with another country, domestic law regularly trumped the operation of Article 26. In 2011, 
Article 26 was revised to provide that certain domestic laws may not be used as a defense to 
complying with an exchange of information request. Thus, the new language in Article 26(5) 
states: “In no case shall the provision of paragraph 3 [outlining appropriate grounds to refuse a 
request] be construed to permit a Contracting State to decline to supply information solely 
because the information is held by a bank, other financial institution, nominee or person acting in 
an agency or a fiduciary capacity or because it relates to ownership interests in a person.”54 
 
5.2.3 Information Sought Not Needed by Requested State. Another 2011 change to Article 26 
sought the eliminate an additional argument that a state might use to decline to provide requested 
information – that the state asked to produce the information has no need or use for the 
information itself in administering its tax law. Article 26(4) now provides that: “If information is 
requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this Article, the other Contracting State shall 
use its information gathering measures to obtain the requested information, even though that 
other State may not need such information for its own tax purposes.” Anticipating that some 
States might try to argue that they are not legally capable of providing information that they do 
not need for a tax purpose (despite the language in Article 26(4)), the UN Commentary for 
Article 26 offers alternative treaty language. This alternative phrasing requires that each 
contracting State must undertake to ensure that its competent authority will have the requisite 
power under domestic law to secure the information needed for tax treaty information exchange 
purposes. In some cases, domestic legislation, rulemaking or administrative changes may be 
necessary to ensure that power.55 
 
5.2.4 Format. Article 26 exchange of information provisions do not require information be 
provided in a certain format. But if there is more uniformity in the content and format of 
information provided by taxpayers to the government, then increasingly, a requesting state 
government might receive information in a desired format. For example, the recommendation 
under BEPS Action Item 13 would notably enhance transparency and disclosure by requiring 
                                                          
54 The OECD Model Treaty Article 26 also bars refusal on the ground of bank secrecy. 
55 Paragraph 26.3 of the Commentary on Article 26 of the United Nations Model Convention. 
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that taxpayers collect, generate, and provide information in a specified format to the tax 
authorities. This rule, implemented in each jurisdiction through domestic legislation (the master 
file, template, local file reporting requirements), would shift the burden to the taxpayers, who 
have a distinct ability to access their own information. To the extent that reporting for the master 
file, template and local file is fairly uniform and consistent over time, across countries, and 
across taxpayers, then the information may be easier for tax authorities to use. For resource 
constrained developing countries, this uniformity could facilitate training and decrease audit 
burdens. 
 
5.2.5 Treaty Article 26 Summary. Existing bilateral tax treaties do remain a relevant tool in 
encouraging transparency and disclosure. First, they can provide the legal basis or framework for 
an agreement between competent authorities to exchange information on an automatic basis (as 
could TIEAs or the Multilateral Convention, see 5.2, 5.4). Second, they may explicitly permit 
requests regarding persons neither resident, nor engaged in economic activity, in the state from 
which information is sought. An automatic exchange of information arrangement would be 
unlikely to include data regarding such persons. Third, the “residual” ability under an Article 26 
provision to seek information upon request remains useful if a country finds that it requires 
information beyond the scope of that provided automatically. 
 
Although bilateral treaty provisions based on the UN or OECD Model Art. 26 are inadequate to 
meet the full range of transparency and disclosure needs of tax administrations today, they 
continue to provide possible access to information not likely available through automatic 
exchange of information or through the taxpayer reporting envisioned by the Action Item 13 
recommendations. 
5.3 Tax Information Exchange Agreements (“TIEAs”). 
These stand-alone agreements, typically negotiated between countries that have not negotiated a 
bilateral tax treaty, focus exclusively on exchange of information. The expectation is that even 
countries that have do not have a bilateral treaty may still seek to exchange tax information. The 
TIEA provides the legal basis and structure for doing so. The OECD Model TIEA, not 
surprisingly, is very similar to Article 26 of the OECD Model Treaty (and the UN Model). The 
primary differences between the OECD Model TIEA and Article 26 include: (1) TIEAs can be 
bilateral or multilateral; (2) TIEAs focus on exchange “upon request”; (3) TIEAs cover specific 
taxes; and (4) TIEAs provides more detail regarding the information that the requesting state 
must provide to initiate its request.  
 
For countries pursuing increased transparency and disclosure in tax, TIEAs provide a legal 
framework and context for countries to agree to exchange information automatically. That is, 
although TIEAs call for exchange “upon request,” they permit contracting states to expand their 
cooperation through agreement by the competent authorities. Thus, just like comprehensive 
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bilateral treaties with Article 26, TIEAs can serve as the legal foundation for countries to commit 
to automatic exchange. To the extent that some developing countries have a more limited 
network of comprehensive tax treaties but do have a network of TIEAs, this role for TIEAs could 
become important. 
5.4 Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters. 
This Convention, which originally was developed by the OECD and the Council of Europe in 
1988, was amended in 2011 to welcome all countries as participants. At present over 60 
countries have signed the convention, including developing countries. To apply, the Convention 
must be signed and ratified by a country – and countries can make individual reservations to the 
basic terms of the Convention. As a result, reliance on the Convention depends on whether the 
countries in question have ratified it and whether they have made any relevant reservations to 
significant terms. But, as a multilateral framework, the Convention offers a potentially valuable 
legal foundation for countries looking to pursue enhanced transparency and disclosure among a 
group of nations in a relatively simultaneous and efficient way. 
 
With respect to exchange of information, the Convention includes a comprehensive 
consideration of (1) prerequisites to exchange, (2) what can be exchanged, and (3) the 
mechanism for exchange.56 As drafted, the Convention envisions exchange of information on 
request, spontaneously, and automatically (according to procedures and terms mutually agreed to 
by two or more parties).57 The Commentary to the Convention emphasizes the value of 
standardization in automatic exchange, noting savings in time and workload, but observes that 
these advantages accrue primarily when large numbers of countries participate in the 
standardization process. The current work on the CRS and CAA for automatic exchange of 
information could provide the formal structure and standardization that could then be 
implemented via the framework of the Convention, with the advantages and concerns for 
developing countries noted in 4.3.4.3. 
5.5 Regional Agreements.  
In addition to bilateral tax treaties, TIEAs, and the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Assistance 
in Administrative Tax matters, there are regional agreements which could serve as the legal basis 
and framework for exchange of information among the signatory states. Examples of such 
regional agreements include: (1) 2008 WAEMU (West African Economic Monetary Union) 
Income and Inheritance Tax Convention (Article 33); (2) the SAARC (South Asian Association 
Matters for Regional Cooperation) Limited Multilateral Agreement on Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and Mutual Administrative Assistance (Article 5); and (3) the Agreement Among the 
Member States of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) for the Avoidance of Double 
                                                          
56 Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, Articles 4, 5, and 6. 
57 Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, Article 6. 
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Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion (Article 24). However, a major limitation of 
regional agreements is their membership. Both the requesting state and the country from which it 
is seeking information must be members of the applicable regional agreement. To the extent a 
country’s taxpayers conduct business or hold their assets and accounts in other jurisdictions, the 
regional agreements offer little assistance. Moreover, their relatively abbreviated exchange of 
information provisions do not detail the expectations regarding the delivery mechanism for 
information and do not call for automatic exchange. 
5.6 Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information.  
5.6.1 Overview. In the late 1990s, many countries became concerned with the effects of tax 
havens and preferential tax regimes which impeded effective tax enforcement by virtue of their 
lack of transparency and their lack of information exchange. As a response, the predecessor of 
the current Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes 
(“Global Forum”) was formed in 2000 under the auspices of the OECD. The Global Forum has 
122 members (August 2014),58 including developed and developing countries, OECD and non-
OECD members. 
 
The Global Forum has pursued two projects relevant to transparency and disclosure: (1) the 
development of the Model Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA), see 5.2, and (2) the 
development and implementation of the Peer Review process (assessing countries’ legal and 
regulatory framework essential to transparency and exchange of information). The Peer Review 
process, which began in 2009, is undertaken in two phases (Phase 1 and Phase 2, though they can 
be combined). The review evaluates a country by reference to its capacity to and actual 
performance in providing information upon request. Thus, the Peer Review process explores the 
degree to which a country is compliant with commitments under treaty provisions comparable to 
Article 26 of the UN or OECD Model Treaties, or the Model TIEA.  
 
The Peer Review process examines a country’s domestic laws and practices along a number of 
dimensions to assess whether: (1) the ownership and identity of entities and arrangements are 
available to the competent authority, (2) reliable accounting records are maintained for such 
entities, (3) account holder banking information is available, (4) competent authority has power 
to obtain and provide information pursuant to an exchange of information request, (5) 
appropriate safeguards apply to persons in the requested country, (6) all relevant partners are 
covered by the jurisdiction’s network of information exchange mechanisms, (7) adequate 
confidentiality mechanisms exist to protect information received, (8) the rights and safeguards of 
taxpayers and third parties are respected, and (9) information is provided in a timely manner  for 
requests made under its exchange of information mechanisms.  
 
                                                          
58 The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes: Information Brief (November 
2013) at 2. 
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Input is sought from all members of the Global Forum during the process of reviewing a specific 
country.59 Members complete an extensive questionnaire about their own practical experience in 
working with the country under review. The review is performed by an assessment team (two 
expert assessors from peer jurisdictions, along with a coordinator from the Global Forum 
Secretariat). The team’s report is presented to the 30-member Peer Review Group (PRG), and 
upon approval becomes a formal report of the PRG. At that stage, the entire membership of the 
Global Forum is asked to approve the report. To date, over 100 countries have participated in the 
Peer Review process and been the subject of a completed and published report. As part of the 
review process, recommendations are made to countries for ways in which to improve their 
ability to participate and cooperate in exchange of information. Over 80 countries have 
introduced or proposed domestic law changes in order to implement the more than 400 
recommendations that have emerged from the Peer Review process.60 
 
5.6.2 Developing Countries and the Global Forum. From the perspective of a developing 
country, a number of observations can be offered regarding the work of the Global Forum. First, 
the promotion of TIEAs can be beneficial to jurisdictions not currently in a position to negotiate 
many bilateral treaties. Second, to the extent the Peer Review process improves the general 
transparency of other jurisdictions’ domestic banking, tax, and regulatory rules, developing 
countries may gain. Assuming developing countries would have had little leverage to instigate 
these transparency changes on their own, they may now find that their information requests made 
to other jurisdictions are more efficiently managed.  
 
Third, a Peer Review of a developing country itself may provide support for the tax 
administration’s internal efforts to encourage and effectuate domestic law (and practice) changes 
consistent with active participation in exchange of information. This will be most true where the 
developing country receives any needed and requested technical assistance on the more detailed 
facets of managing information and requests.61 Fourth, the current benchmark for the Peer 
Reviews is exchange upon request (which still imposes burdens on developing countries, see 
4.3.4.1). But the domestic law and infrastructure standards that the Peer Review process 
promotes would also be essential if and when countries ultimately adopt some version of 
automatic exchange of information. Finally, to gain the maximum benefit from other countries’ 
enhanced compliance, developing countries need to be in a position to request information (until 
automatic exchange takes hold) and to make effective use of such information. Additional work 
by the Global Forum in providing this assistance to developing countries, consistent with the 
G20’s emphasis on ensuring that all states benefit from improved exchange of information, 
                                                          
59 The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes: Information Brief (November 
2013) at 6-7. 
60 The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes: Information Brief (November 
2013) at 4. 
61 See, e.g., Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Tax Transparency 2013: 
Report on Progress, at 23 (outlining technical assistance opportunities). 
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would help guarantee that developing countries are not just providers of information but also 
knowledgeable “consumers” of exchanged information.62 
5.7 Summary of Existing Support for Transparency and Disclosure:  
Transparency and disclosure is not new to international tax. Article 26 of the U.N. and the 
OECD Model Treaties calls for exchanging information “upon request” and in recent years, 
changes made to the provision enhance the likelihood that effective and useful information 
exchange can take place. Among the most important reforms were: (1) elimination of domestic 
bank secrecy rules as a justification for denying a request for information; (2) reduction of the 
threshold that the requesting State must meet to demonstrate that the information requested is 
“foreseeably relevant for carrying out the provisions of the Convention or the administration or 
enforcement of domestic tax laws of the contracting States;” and (3) elimination of the argument 
that requested information need not be provided because the requested State does not need the 
information. Additionally, the work of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information, particularly the Peer Review Process, has the potential to help countries seeking to 
improve their own transparency and disclosure laws (which will improve both their own 
enforcement capacity and their ability to participate globally in the transparency and disclosure 
projects). Moreover, to the extent the Peer Review Process improves the transparency and 
disclosure capacity of countries from which a developing country is seeking information, the 
developing countries need not expend resources to encourage such reform in its partners. 
6. Summary Observations Regarding the Role of Tax Transparency 
and Disclosure in Preventing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. 
 
Base erosion and profit shifting are critical problems for all countries, but especially developing 
countries that rely significantly on the corporate income tax. Although many reforms will be 
important to a successful global response to this challenge, increased transparency and disclosure 
regarding multinational businesses are essential. Countries face a number of barriers to achieving 
this level of transparency and disclosure. First, domestic law may not currently require adequate 
reporting regarding financial accounts, cross-border related party transactions, foreign financial 
                                                          
62 See, e.g., Communiqué G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors  
Moscow, July 20, 2013 (“All countries must benefit from the new transparent environment and we call on the 
Global Forum on Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to work with the OECD task force on tax and 
development, the World Bank Group and others to help developing countries identify their need for technical 
assistance and capacity building.”) available at 
http://en.g20russia.ru/events_financial_track/20130719/780961553.html; Global Forum on Transparency and 
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Tax Transparency 2013: Report on Progress, at 25 (outlining technical 
assistance opportunities). 
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assets, and foreign business activities. The final recommendations emerging from the BEPS 
Project, in particular those grounded in Action Items 12 and 13, may prove especially useful as 
guides for countries exploring domestic reform. Additionally, the Global Forum on Transparency 
and Disclosure’s Peer Review Process provides a mechanism for both assessing and facilitating 
domestic improvements in transparency and disclosure. 
Second, countries may face domestic enforcement impediments to their effective acquisition and 
use of information. Developing countries that are resource-constrained (e.g., limited audit staff, 
limited international tax expertise, limited technological resources) might find it difficult to seek 
and acquire the information necessary to effectively audit all of the major multinational 
businesses operating in their jurisdiction. To the extent proposed reforms can ease any of these 
constraints or burdens, the reforms may be particularly useful to developing countries. 
Conversely, if reforms require resources or treaty relationships not currently available to many 
countries then their formal adoption will likely have less impact on resource-constrained states. 
Third, effective responses to base erosion and profit shifting will require engagement with the 
broader tax community. Information can be sought directly from taxpayers, but often important 
information will be needed from other countries. Thus, the crucial question is whether a state has 
treaty relationships (bilateral, TIEA, or other) with the countries from which it is most likely to 
need information. If the transparency and disclosure reforms rely less on bilateral relationships, 
and more on multilateral approaches, jurisdictions with more limited treaty networks can more 
readily enjoy the benefits of the new reforms. 
Among the most prominent proposals for transparency and disclosure reform currently underway 
are the documentation reforms of BEPS Action Item 13 (focused on improved reporting for 
transfer pricing documentation and the global activities of a multinational group). The proposed 
reporting package under Action Item 13 includes: (1) Master file (standardized global 
information regarding the multinational group); (2) Country-by-Country template (which reports 
seven information items on a country by country basis for the group, along with identifying 
information on entities operating in each jurisdiction); and (3) Local file (more country-specific 
detail regarding activities, assets, income and related party transactions). The reporting package 
is anticipated to help tax administrators assess risk and focus audit efforts. This assistance is 
especially valuable for resource constrained-countries seeking to allocate scarce audit resources 
to their more serious and relevant base erosion and profit shifting problems. A number of 
important issues continue to be debated regarding Action Item 13. For example, depending on 
how the information is delivered it may be more or less accessible to jurisdictions. If the Master 
file and Country-by-Country template are only provided to the residence jurisdiction of the 
MNE’s parent (to then be shared via exchange of information requests), developing countries 
with limited treaty networks, or limited resources to pursue treaty requests, or both, would face a 
burden retrieving the information. At the same time, taxpayers have voiced concerns over their 
own potential documentation burden, the risks of inadequate data protection, and the possibility 
that countries will use the information in unintended ways (e.g., as a replacement for audit). 
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Of course, the BEPS project is not the sole avenue for potential reform in transparency and 
disclosure. The OECD and G20 have advocated for increased use of automatic exchange of 
information. To further this goal, in 2014 the OECD released a proposed Common Reporting 
Standard (“CRS”), a Model Competent Authority Agreement, and a Commentary for automatic 
exchange of information. As with the work under Action Item 13, reforms that increase uniform 
provision of information more directly to states can be distinctly advantageous for developing 
countries trying to maximize the impact of their available tax administration resources. A critical 
question will be the legal framework under which the automatic exchange would occur. A 
multilateral mechanism for sharing information (that included countries from which information 
would likely be sought) would best serve states with limited treaty partners. But allowing 
developing countries temporary access to automatic exchange on a non-reciprocal basis would 
allow these countries to start tackling base erosion immediately, with relatively little risk to other 
countries. 
Finally, countries can continue to explore the use of existing bilateral treaties and TIEAs to seek 
taxpayer information. The U.N. and OECD Model Treaties both incorporate new standards that 
reject bank secrecy as a ground for refusing to share information and reduce the requesting 
State’s burden to show the precise use of the information sought.  
Ultimately, transparency and disclosure of information remain vital to the effective enforcement 
of tax laws in a global economy. All countries should be attentive to the existing techniques for 
obtaining needed information, and should evaluate active reform proposals for their relevance, 
effectiveness, and required capacity building. Transparency and disclosure have center stage in 
international tax policy reform and the goal is to ensure that the outcomes of this focus 
meaningfully reduce the base erosion and profit shifting faced by jurisdictions around the world. 
